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Introduction
While the clairvoyant may have anticipated it earlier, the policy strug-
gle between environmental protection and liberal trade effectively began
in August 1991. That month, as has been recounted numerous times,1 a
* Counsel, Defenders of Wildlife. Adjunct Professor, University of Baltimore
School of Law. J.D., 1989, George Washington University;, BA, 1986, University of
California, Los Angeles.
** Legal Intern, Defenders of Wildlife, Summer 1994. J.D. Candidate, 1995,
Temple University Law School; BA, 1991, Bryn Mawr College.
The title of this article is derived from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This
was the seminal criminal procedural rights case. This title reflects the belief that just as
the Miranda Warning became a cornerstone in criminal procedural rights, PPMs, infra
Introduction, will also become a cornerstone in trade and environmental policy-
making.
The authors wish to thank Steve Charnovitz, Rob Housman, and Robert Morris for
comments on earlier drafts of this article and Charles Beretz for help with the final
preparation.
1. See, e.g., Eric Christensen & Samantha Geffen, GA7T Sets Its Net On Environmental
Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for
Reform of the International Trading System, 23 U. MAiAM INmER-AM. L. Rv. 569 (1991-92);
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) arbitral panel declared
that provisions of the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act 2 (MMPA) were
contrary to existing GATT rules.8 Although the panel's decision had sev-
eral distinct legal elements, the crux of the dispute brought by the govern-
ment of Mexico-and the basis of the panel's decision-was the U.S.
executive's mandate to ban the importation of certain tuna caught by a
fishing technique that kills and maims dolphins.4 Today, this tuna/
dolphin decision has come to characterize the entire debate over trade
and environment.
This paper analyzes the GATT's fear of legitimizing trade-based pro-
duction and process methods (PPMs) by dissecting the pertinent facts of
the two tuna/dolphin cases, analyzing the GATT'sjurisprudence on GATT
Articles III and XX, examining the rather ugly philosophical underbelly of
the free trade system,5 and presenting a new vision for "sustainable devel-
opment"6 in an interdependent world economy.
I. The Setting- What Goes Around Comes Around
What do canned tuna, recycled plastic, sustainably-cut timber, and refor-
mulated gasoline have in common? They are all consumer products that
have been "produced"-manufactured, harvested, extracted, built, or pre-
pared-in an environmentally conscious manner. When trade restrictions
regulate the environmentally destructive methods of production of an
afflicted product, these restrictions are generally known as "process stan-
dards,"7 or perhaps more accurately, as PPM trade measures. Whatever
Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A
Pimer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 535 (1992).
2. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), Pub. L. No. 95-552, 86 Stat.
1027 (codified with amendment at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1362, 1371-1384, 1401-1407 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)).
3. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report of the Pane4 GAT, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter B.I.S.D.], 39th Supp. 155 (1993),
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin 1].
4. 1& at para. 7.1; see also MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a) (2) ("The Secretary of the
Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which have
been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in incidental kill or inci-
dental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of U.S. standards.").
5. See, e.g., HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD 209
(1994) (quoting eminent economist Paul Krugman, "If there were an Economist's
Creed it would surely contain the affirmations, 'I believe in the Principle of Compara-
tive Advantage,' and 'I believe in free trade.... .'"); PAUL R. KRUGMAN, PEDDUNG PROS-
PERnrT ECONOMIC SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 229
(1994) ("Loosely, comparative advantage says that countries trade in order to benefit
from their differences."). The historic origin of the doctrine of comparative advantage
is widely attributed to David Ricardo. See DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817).
6. SeeTHz WoRLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT]. Development is sustainable if
it "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs." Id at 8.
7. Symptomatic of the entire "trade and environment" debate, terms often mean
different things to "environmentalists" and to "traders." Such is the case with "stan-
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their label, these trade measures have become a primary focus of a larger
international policy debate that threatens to make economic growth and
ecological protection needlessly antagonistic.
From an environmental perspective, PPMs8 cut to the very heart of
environmental protection. Clean air and water are not possible without
laws that control the PPMs causing excessive pollution.9 Excessive solid
waste and persistent hazardous waste are both the result of harmful PPMs
and, as such, are regulated accordingly.' 0 Because indiscriminate PPMs
have led to depleted fisheries, denuded forests, and species extinctions,
conservation law seeks to manage them in a variety of ways." Even stat-
utes that directly regulate products like toxics, pesticides, and other haz-
ardous chemical compounds must ultimately address production
methods.12 In example after example, all environmental problems can
eventually be traced to environmentally destructive PPMs. Without the
ability to regulate PPMs, environmental law would be virtually useless.'
3
Of course, environmental treaties or laws that seek to influence PPMs
are not by themselves in conflict with international trade. Only if a coun-
dards." The trade community defines mandatory compliance trade measures as techni-
cal regulations and those for which compliance is not mandatory as standards. The U.S.
environmental community defines standards as binding legal requirements a legislature
or regulatory agency created, while it defines regulations as administrative rules that
implement statutory law. This paper uses the environmental set of definitions.
8. Trade measures do not always enforce PPM requirements. It is also important
to note the distinction in trade law between PPM standards that directly relate to the
product itself (where the country of consumption directly feels the environmental con-
sequence of a production externality) and PPM standards that do not directly relate to
the product (where there exists an environmental externality occurring at the produc-
tion site). See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), INTERIM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PPM MEASURES, COM/TD/ENV(94)39
(Apr. 6-7, 1994). This distinction is the result of the trade principle "like product,"
discussed infra part IV. For purposes of this paper, "PPM" will refer to standards seek-
ing to regulate behavior at the production site, regardless of the consumption effects.
9. See, e.g., Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988).
10. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
11. See, e.g., Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1861 (1988); Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1988); National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1988); Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988);
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (1988).
13. See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (Law. Co-op. 1989
& Supp. 1993); BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 41-55 (1990); San-
dra Postel, Carrying Capacity: Earth's Bottom Line, in STATE OF THE WORLD 3 (Lester
Brown ed., 1994). Of course, overall world consumption patterns are also critical to
achieving sustainable development. Yet even here, one could argue that a PPM trade
measure based on the natural resource use intensity of a given product would ade-
quately internalize environmental costs at consumption.
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try wishes to control harmful PPMs with restrictions on imports or exports
do these trade restrictions run into trouble with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.x4 But quite often in today's international commu-
nity, the most effective means of enforcing a process standard is with trade
leverage. This is not to say that trade restrictions can cure all environmen-
tal woes or that they will always have the desired environmental effect.
Nonetheless, the situation today is that innovative domestic and interna-
tional efforts to limit environmentally harmful PPMs are in grave jeopardy
because of existing interpretations of international trade law.
In many ways, the GATT-the umbrella agreement governing inter-
national trade law-is a victim of its own success. From its inception in
1947 to the end of the Tokyo Round of GATT in 1979, tariffs around the
world dropped precipitously and will sink further as a result of the Uru-
guay Round.15 Consequently, trade negotiators have begun, starting with
the Tokyo Round in 1973, to address the many types of non-tariff barri-
ers-including environmentally based trade measures-as potentially dis-
guised or arbitrary trade barriers. Although non-tariff barrier negotiations
stalled during the preceding Kennedy Round of GATT talks, 16 the Tokyo
Round produced the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),
or the "Standards Code."17 Although the Standards Code explicitly
addresses environmental standards, it shares the flaw of its apparent suc-
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in B.I.S.D., supra note 3,4th Supp. 1 (1969)
[hereinafter GATIT]. As will be discussed further, the Uruguay Round has not meaning-
fully addressed PPMs. Similarly, the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA], along with
its environmental agreement, North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.LM. 1480 [hereinafter Environmental Side Agreement], also
failed to resolve adequately the PPM problem. See NAFTA, supra, arts. 309, 907, 915,
2101; Environmental Side Agreement, supra, arts. 10(2) (b), (m), (p).
15. On December 15, 1993, the 117 signatories to the GATT reached a tentative
agreement on the so-called Uruguay Round of negotiations. Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Final Agree-
ment], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.LM. 9 (1994) reprinted in OFFICE or
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATivE, FINAL Aar EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTLATERAL TRADE NEGoTrATIoNS (VERSION OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
These negotiations lowered tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers on a number of trad-
ing items (e.g., manufactured products such as steel, textiles, and computer parts) and
established rules in new trading disciplines (e.g., services, agriculture, and intellectual
property rights). The GATT parties also created the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which will serve as the formal institution enforcing trade disciplines established
by the Uruguay Round and previous GATT rules. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral
[World) Trade Organization (WTO), GAIT Doc. MTN/FA II (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], in Final Agreemen supra. The Uruguay Round was signed on April 15,
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, and now each party must implement its accord. See also
PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE PoLicY 70 (1993). Traditional
macro-economic theory states that the drop in tariffs after World War II led to unprece-
dented global growth.
16. Low, supra note 15, at 173.
17. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 26th Supp. 8
(1980).
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cessor, the Uruguay Round's Agreement on TBTs. 18 Both agreements
exclude PPM trade measures from protection.
While the environmental community has made the most noise about
this issue, PPMs are also central to business enterprises as they can signifi-
cantly affect costs and profit margins throughout a product's life cycle.
Business umbrella groups, such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), often create multilateral standards to increase har-
monization, prevent protectionism, and increase economic efficiency.
19
What is new to business about trade-based environmental PPMs is that
they are usually mandatory and are sometimes even used unilaterally.
20
Yet environmental PPM standards hold the promise not only of improving
the global environment, but also of promoting the $200 to 400 billion per
year "enviro-tech" goods and services industry.
2 1
At its core, however, the debate over PPMs and much of the trade/
environment relationship is fundamentally about democracy. Who
decides when and why trade restrictions based on PPMs are appropriate?
Citizens of a country speaking through their legislature? Or an interna-
tional trade organization, directly accountable only to member govern-
ments and career bureaucrats? How much legal authority the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and similar institutions receive and how such
institutions settle disputes are vitally important democratic questions
related to PPMs. Ironically, both the trade and environmental policy areas
are in the general long-term interests of the public, but they are often
targets for short-sighted special interests. 2 2 Because of the power of mod-
em technology, citizens around the globe are increasingly linked by both
trade and common environmental threats.
23
Thus, in a world where national governments are unable to control
18. Agreement on Technical Barres to Trade, GATr Doc. MTN/FA II-AIA-6 (Dec. 15,
1993) [hereinafter TBT Agreement], in inal Agreemen supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., PATRICK COOKE, OFFICE OF STANDARDS SERvicEs, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERcE, TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS (PPMs), Mar. 1990,
at 1. "The explosion in technological development has broadened and deepened the
need for standardization. In these process-intensive high technology industries, the
application of PPM standards... are becoming much more prevalent, with PPM-related
provisions frequently required in the determination of conformity to regulatory
requirements." Id. at 2.
20. See, e.g., UNITED STATES COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, [STATEMENT] ON
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THE USE OF TRADE MEASURES TO
ACHIEvE THEIR OBjEarrEs 1 (Dec. 15, 1993). If governments choose to regulate PPMs,
business generally prefers them to be performance-based and not technology-based.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
Ev. 1333 (1985).
21. See CURTIS A. MOORE & ALAN S. MITUER, GREEN GOLD: ENviRONMENTAL TECH-
NOLOGY AND THE RACE TO CAPrURE INDUSTRIAL DOMINANCE OF THE 21sr CENTURY
(1993).
22. See Daniel Esty, GATTing the Greens: Not Just Greening the GAT', 72 FOREIGN AFr.
32 (1993).
23. See, e.g., id.;Jerry Mander, Megatechnology, Trade, and the New World Order in THE
CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE 13 (Earth Island Institute ed., 1993).
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every event,24 a successful resolution of the PPMs and overarching trade/
environment debate will turn on whether international trade law is able to
adapt to the general public's simultaneous desire to protect the environ-
ment and to live comfortably. It can be expected that multinational cor-
porations, which account for roughly three quarters of all world trade,
25
will vigilantly defend their turf by pressing for open markets and invest-
ment protection. Lesser developed countries (LDCs) will balk if PPM
standards are perceived to be unfairly limiting their market access to the
developed world.26 Yet despite such complicated international politics,
rules linking environmental protection and liberal trade can and must be
forged. If not, both the sustainability of the planet's rich natural resources
and the viability of the world trading system will be in grave danger.
2 7
HI. Rocking the Boat, Part I: Tuna/Dolphin I
The political flap over PPMs began in earnest with the original and infa-
mous 28 tuna/dolphin GATT decision.29 Although this case has already
been analyzed countless times,3 0 it is startling how many legal commenta-
tors-including the GAIT panelists themselves-either omit or misstate
pivotal facts relating to this seminal decision. Instead of recounting the
entire tuna/dolphin saga, which by itself could fill the space of a book, key
points relating to this conflict will be emphasized.3 ' In short, this still
unresolved case centers on U.S. restrictions of yellowfin tuna imports from
those countries whose nationals kill an excessive number of dolphins in
the process of catching tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.
3 2
24. See, e.g., Peter Drucker, Trade Lessons From the World Economy, 73 FoREIGN Arr. 99,
104-08 (1994). Although Drucker does not make the argument, one could even argue
that his discussion of global investment patterns suggests that the seemingly unrelated
problems of trade/environment and U.S.-Japan bilateral trade are connected by dis-
putes over money flows.
25. See TIM LANG & COLIN HrNis, THE NEW PROTECTIONIsM 34 (1993). Further-
more, over 40% of world trade is conducted within multinational corporations. Id.
26. See, e.g., John Zarcostas, Developing Nations Oppose Environmental Trade Panel, J.
COM., Feb. 16, 1994, at 1A. Some LDCs also object to the growth of certain intellectual
property protection provisions. Vandana Shiva, Biodiversity and Intellectual Pmperty
Rights, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE, supra note 23, at 108.
27. See, e.g., President's News Conference with European Union Leaders in Brussels,
30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 33 (Jan. 11, 1994). "[W]e simply have to assure that our
economic policies also protect the environment ... and our common interest in
enhancing environmental protection throughout the globe."
28. Though infamous to environmentalists and others, the GATT Secretariat has
been notably less concerned as it not only has publicly supported the panel decision,
but it has also rejected any notion that present trade rules and environmental objectives
are at all incompatible. GATT SECRETARIAT, 1 INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90-91, 22-23
(1992).
29. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3.
30. See supra note 1.
31. It should be noted from the outset that the modus operandi of the purse seine
fishery at issue here is to intentionally cast nets on schools of dolphin in order to catch
the large yellowfin tuna that flock beneath them.
32. The MMPA has forced the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to ban the import of
yellowfin tuna from Mexico, Venezuela, and Vanuatu for violating "comparability"
Vol. 27
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Perhaps the most misleading characterization of the tuna/dolphin
dispute is that it is merely an "animal welfare" issue.3 3 While the public
campaign to end the purse seine fishery has certainly used the "Flipper"
angle to advocate a dolphin-safe tuna policy, it would be surprising for any
conservationist to claim that the slaughter of over seven million dolphins
by the fishery since the late 1950s is not a serious conservation problem.
3 4
Indeed, subsequent to the GATT panel decision, several dolphin species
directly impacted by the fishery were listed as "depleted" under the
MMPA. 35 These designations have placed additional restrictions upon the
remaining three U.S. boats that continue to set nets on dolphins, which in
turn has made the MMPA's "comparability" criteria for foreign fleets more
stringent.
3 6
Another persistent mischaracterization of the tuna/dolphin conflict
is that the United States has unilaterally bullied other countries in a way
that offends others' national sovereignty.3 7 Sovereignty, however, is a two-
edged sword. If there is a danger in the United States telling other coun-
tries how to produce certain goods, there is at least an equal danger in the
GATT requiring the United States to accept products regardless of their
environmental effect.38 In addition, the GATICs preoccupation with uni-
lateral measures ignores the fact that international environmental agree-
ments do not simply appear out of thin air.3 9 International agreements
dolphin kill standards. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2). The MMPA also prohibits the importa-
tion of any fish caught with large-scale high seas driftnets. Id.
33. This is not to imply that "animal welfare" issues do not raise serious moral and
conservation questions.
34. Some now contend that setting nets on dolphins is biologically preferable to
catching free swimming yellowfin tuna because bycatch is lower and the effect on tuna
stocks is better. This is a preposterous argument. Considering the fact that there is
presently a glut of cheap canned tuna on the world market (from both eastern tropical
Pacific (ETP) and non-ETP tuna fisheries), any negative conservation effects from non-
dolphin tuna fishing should be remedied by regulating entry into the ETP fishery, not
by allowing the sets on dolphins. Even in the ETP today, where dolphin setting persists,
fishermen often set purse seine nets on mature free swimming yellowfin because it is
economically advantageous for them to do so. There are abundant stocks of tuna else-
where around the world, most notably in the western tropical Pacific ocean where tre-
mendously large numbers of fast reproducing skipjack tuna exist. Telephone interview
with David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute, in San Francisco, Cal.
(Feb. 7, 1994).
35. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Listing of the Northeastern Off-
shore Spotted Dolphin as Depleted, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,285 (1993). Taking and Importing
of Marine Mammals; Listing of Eastern Spinner Dolphin as Depleted, 58 Fed. Reg.
45,066 (1993).
36. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), afj'd, 929
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991); Earth Island Inst. v. Brown, 865 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
37. See GAIT SECRETARIAT, supra note 28, at 28-31.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8. Although the GAIT does not possess the legal author-
ity to change or override U.S. law, it can, nonetheless, place undue economic pressure
on certain trade-based laws by permitting retaliatory trade measures against countries
with GATT-inconsistent trade restrictions. GAT, supra note 14, art. XXIII.
39. See, e.g., Steve Chamovitz, Environmental Trade Measures: Multilateral or Unilat-
eral?, 23 ENvm. POL'Y & L. 154 (1993). Regardless of their authorizing origin, all trade
measures are inevitably enforced and implemented by national governments.
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almost always necessitate leadership from a progressive country.40 Indeed,
the tuna/dolphin panel completely ignored years of effort by the U.S. to
negotiate an international agreement through the Inter-American Tropi-
cal Tuna Commission (IATTC).
4 1
Mexico's strongest argument against the U.S. MMPA tuna import
requirements may center on the issue of business certainty.42 Despite the
fact that the MMPA makes allowances for foreign fleets43 and despite the
fact that Mexican fishermen can obtain current information on U.S.
dolphin kill rates from the IATrC, Mexico's daily fishing practices and
U.S. export opportunities are dependent upon the activities of the U.S.
tuna fleet in a way that made strategic economic planning difficult.44 One
simple solution, of course, would be to revoke the U.S. permit for setting
nets on dolphins, thereby creating the highly certain comparability stan-
dard of zero.45 Another answer might be to "cap" a low annual kill/set
ratio for both the U.S. and the foreign fleets at the beginning of each year
and have such a regime vigorously enforced by an international body.
Yet another potential solution would be to ban the importation of
tuna by each violative fishing vessel, niot by each country's aggregate vessel
performance. 46 The advantages of this approach are that the trade restric-
40. For instance, Great Britain unilaterally forbade the human slave trade in the
19th century, which eventually led to international consensus on the subject. Regard-
less of one's opinion on dolphin protection, the MMPA has been extraordinarily effec-
tive in reducing dolphin kills in the ETP, as the number of dolphin deaths caused by
U.S. fishermen dropped from 19,714 in 1988 to 115 in 1993, and the number of overall
dolphin deaths in the ETP dropped from over hundreds of thousands in the mid-1980s
to less than 4000 in 1993. Telephone interview with David Phillips (based on publicly
available Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATrC) numbers), supra note 34.
41. One prominent reason explaining the failure of the IATrC to broker a success-
ful dolphin accord is that the organization has historically been more interested with
tuna as a commodity than with dolphins as a conservation concern. Thus, in 1992, the
United States and Mexico attempted to negotiate a bilateral agreement to stop dolphin
deaths by the tuna fishery, but Mexico balked at the last minute. See International
Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992 (IDCA), Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1411-1418 (Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter IDCA].
42. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3, para. 5.28. "[T]he Mexican authorities could not
know whether, at a given point of time, their policies conformed to the United States'
dolphin protection standards." I&
43. The MMFA's dolphin kill limits, for example, permit foreign fleets a 25% cush-
ion when calculating comparability to U.S. kill/set ratios. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a) (2) (B) (II).
44. Imagine a U.S. industry being similarly held directly hostage to the daily pollu-
tion or output fluctuations of a foreign industry.
45. See, e.g., IDCA, supra note 41. The bilateral agreement would establish a mora-
torium on the practice of setting nets on dolphins to catch tuna. Although the U.S.
fleet has only three boats still setting on dolphins (Mexico has roughly 40), the morato-
rium approach would quash any talk of U.S. hypocrisy concerning dolphin conserva-
tion. Telephone interview with David Phillips, supra note 34.
46. This more "direct" regulatory approach was advocated by some during the
NAFTA side agreement debate on whether and how to apply "sanctions" for failure to
enforce established environmental laws. The negotiated NAFTA environmental agree-
ment will apply sanctions only against governments not individuals or corporations.
Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 14, art. 36. For a discussion of a Foreign
Environmental Practices Act, see infra, part VIII.D.
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tions would be directly tied to the undesirable behavior,47 and individual
fishermen would possess a real incentive to fish dolphin-safely.48 Cutting
against this approach, however, is the danger of effectively subsidizing
dolphin-unsafe practices by commonly owned fleets, who could sell
dolphin-safe tuna to the United States while selling dolphin-unsafe tuna
elsewhere. 4 9 In addition, by embargoing all Mexican yellowfin tuna based
on the national kill/set ratio, dolphin-safe fishermen possess a strong
incentive to change Mexican policy.50
Whatever the final resolution to the tuna/dolphin epic,5 1 it should be
clear that the events leading up to and following the GATT panel decision
are far from simple. The panel's treatment of this case at best demon-
strated the GATT's insensitivity toward hard-fought conservation victories
won in democratic fora, and at worst it revealed the GATIT's insidious
desire to exempt international commerce from any legitimate or reason-
able regulatory oversight. From a legal perspective, the panel decision
raised many more questions than it answered.
I. Rocking the Boat, Part H: Tuna/Dolphin H
Just one year after the successful GAIT challenge by Mexico against the
U.S. primary embargo provisions, the European Community (now Union)
and the Netherlands challenged the MMPA's intermediary embargo provi-
sions52 as violative of U.S. GATT obligations. In May 1994, a GATT arbitral
panel found that both the primary and intermediary country embargoes
were notjustified under several relevant GATT provisions. 53 Although the
Tuna/Dolphin II Panel was not as obstreperous or strident against the
47. Note the important distinction between trade sanctions, which target imported
products unrelated to the objectionable behavior and PPM trade measures, which target
imported products directly related to the objectionable behavior. See, e.g., Steve
Charnovitz, Trade and the Environment: The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the
Debate, 23 EmrL. L. 475, 491-92 (1992).
48. Approximately ten Mexican boats are already fishing dolphin-safely. In addi-
tion, because the U.S. market is roughly 65% of the world market, many potential fish-
ermen want access. Telephone interview with David Phillips, supra note 34.
49. This is particularly true with Mexico because one-third of all boats are owned by
the government, none of which are fishing dolphin-safely. Id. If a "boat" policy were
implemented, the government could catch and sell dolphin-safe tuna to the United
States (where it sells at higher prices) and continue to catch and to sell dolphin-unsafe
tuna elsewhere. A potential solution to this problem could be to cap dolphin kills at an
acceptably low level at the start of each year.
50. This assumes a publicly accountable democratic government.
51. The Mexican complaint is not alone. The European Union has challenged the
MMPA's intermediary tuna embargoes under the GATT rules, and this will be discussed
in part III of this paper, infra, Intermediary embargoes are required under the MMPA
when countries who import tuna from primarily embargoed countries seek to then
export such tuna to the United States. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2) (C); Earth
Island Inst. v. Mosbacher (Earth Island II), No. 88-1380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1992).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
53. United States-Restictions on Imports of Tuna (II): Report of the Pane GAIT Doc.
DS29/R (May 20, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin fl].
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MMPA as its judicial predecessor, its reasoning and final decision were not
much different. This assertion deserves elaboration.
Under GATT Article III, an importing country can make laws or regu-
lations affecting internal sales, offerings for sale, transportation, distribu-
tion, or use as long as such measures apply to both domestic products and
to imported products. 5 4 However, the Panel, like that in Tuna/Dolphin I,
made a distinction between actual products and practices that produce
such products.55 Harvesting tuna is a practice which does not change the
characteristics of tuna as a product. Thus, according to both tuna/
dolphin panels, an importing country cannot distinguish between prod-
ucts not produced in conformity with its domestic policies. 5 6 Under pres-
ent international trade law, a can of tuna is a can of tuna-regardless of
whether thousands of dolphins were killed in the process of catching that
tuna.
Under GATT Article XI, with some limited exceptions, the importing
country cannot create prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes,
or other charges against imported products.5 7 Both tuna/dolphin panels
found that the embargoes (or "zero") were unallowable quantitative
restrictions. Thus, the U.S. measures were found to be inconsistent with
Article XI.58
GATT Article XX contains a number of "exceptions" to GATT rules,
including those relating to environmental and natural resource protec-
tion. Accordingly, the Tuna/Dolphin II Panel also considered justifica-
tion of the intermediary embargo measures under Article XX(b), (d), and
(g). These provisions state:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect the human, animal, or plant life or health;
[or]
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; [or]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption [.J59
54. GATT, supra note 14, art. III.
55. Tuna/Dolphin H, supra note 53, para. 5.8.
56. Id.
57. GAT, supra note 14, art. XI.
58. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53, para. 5.10.
59. GATr, supra note 14, art. XX.
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The Panel applied a three prong analysis in evaluating the MMPA
under Article XX's environmental exceptions:
60
1) Whether the policy with respect to the legal provisions of the
MMPA fell within the range of Article XX environmental exceptions;
2) Whether the measure for which the exception was being invoked
fell within the range of Article XX; and
3) Whether the measure was applied in a manner that did not consti-
tute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade.
The MMPA's primary and intermediary country embargo provisions
passed the first prong under both XX(b) and XX(g). Under XX(g), the
Panel found that dolphins were an exhaustible natural resource.61 And,
in one of the few promising, albeit baby step, developments in interna-
tional trade law, it also found for several reasons that XX(g) may apply to
policies related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, even
if those resources are outside a contracting party's territorial jurisdic-
tion.6 2 First, the text of XX(g) did not limit the location of the
resources.6 3 Second, two other GATT panels on migratory fish under
XX(g) made no distinction between fishing inside or outside territorial
jurisdiction.64 The GATT possesses no absolute proscription on conserva-
tion measures outside a party's territorial jurisdiction, unlike the extrater-
ritorial proscription it can impose on products made with prison labor.
65
Finally, under general international law, states may regulate their citizens'
and vessels' conduct with respect to persons, animals, plants, and natural
resources outside their territories.
66
However, the MMPA's primary and intermediary embargo nation pro-
visions did not pass the second prong of the Panel's test under either
XX(b) or XX(g). Under XX(b), the United States argued that "necessary"
meant "needed," while the EU argued that it meant "indispensable" or
"unavoidable."6 7 The Panel, following previous panel decisions, agreed
that the United States should look for reasonably consistent alternatives,
and if no such alternatives exist, then it should look for the one which
entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.
68
Significantly, the Panel did not take into account that some alternatives
might be more environmentally sustainable, more politically achievable,
or more enforceable than others, despite greater "inconsistency" with the
GATT.
60. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53, paras. 5.12, 5.29.
61. Id. para. 5.13.
62. Id. para. 5.20.
63. Id. para. 5.15.
64. Id.
65. I& para. 5.16; GATr, supra note 14, art. XX(e).
66. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53, para. 5.17.
67. Id. para. 5.34.
68. I& para. 5.35.
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Similarly, under XX(g), the EU argued that the measures had to be
"primarily aimed" at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and
at rendering effective the restrictions on domestic production and con-
sumption.6 9 The Panel agreed, by noting that the intermediary country
embargo included all tuna whether or not it was harvested in a dolphin-
safe manner and whether or not the country had implemented practices
comparable to U.S. practices. Consequently, the Panel found that the pri-
mary country and intermediary country. embargoes could not by them-
selves further the U.S. dolphin conservation objectives, but they were only
effective if the primary countries changed their practices of harvesting
tuna.70 The Panel concluded that the U.S. embargoes force other coun-
tries to change their policies with respect to conservation practices in their
own jurisdictions in order for the U.S. measures to be effective in protect-
ing dolphins.
7 1
Despite the Panel's conclusions on XX(g), it is disputable whether
the EU's conservation policies are in fact comparable to the U.S. prac-
tices. 72 In any event, to say that embargoes used for environmental objec-
tives by themselves will be "ineffective" is to deny the strong influence trade
leverage possesses over trade-related objectionable behavior like dolphin-
deadly fishing practices. The Tuna/Dolphin II Panel injected a "causa-
tion" test found or supported nowhere in the text of Article XX.
While the supposed objective of the GATT is to discourage protec-
tionism and to encourage open access to markets, there is no provision
mandating that a country must open its border to any product regardless
of its environmental consequences. 73 Examined under this light, both
tuna/dolphin panels are not solely about rights of market access, but they
are also about a sovereign country's ability to implement even-handedly a
conservation law in accordance with its citizens' desires. Thus, the asser-
tion by the Tuna/Dolphin II Panel that the EU possesses "comparable"
dolphin protection measures, even if true, raises the vital issue of demo-
cratic accountability under GATi' jurisprudence.
The Panel also specifically examined whether measures under XX(b)
and (g) could include measures that forced other countries to change
69. Id. para. 5.21.
70. Id. para. 5.23.
71. 1& para. 5.24.
72. Because of the GATT's closed door panel deliberation policy, no conservation
law experts were allowed to address this point.
73. See, e.g.,Japan: Ozone Concerns Spur CaUs forApple Import Ban, GREFNmRE,June 7,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (citing JAPAN TiMS, June 6-12,
1994). This article reports that
Japanese citizen groups are campaigning against the import of apples from
New Zealand and the US [sic] because ozone-destroying methyl bromide is
used on the fruit before it enters Japan. The apples are treated to destroy
"harmful" codling moths reportedly not found in Japan. "Why has Japan to
import apples when such imports lead to environmental destruction? The
country produces sufficient apples at home," said Machiko Tsuji of the Anti-
Pesticide Network of Tokyo.
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their policies within their own jurisdictions. 74 Looking to the purpose of
the GATT, the Panel chose to interpret Article XX very narrowly. The
Panel blithely asserted that if environmental trade measures were allowed
to force changes in other countries' jurisdictions, then the balance of the
GATT would be upset and the GATT objectives would be impaired.75 A
cynic could ask, "What balance?" and "What objectives?"
Because the MMPA dolphin-safe provisions did not pass the second
prong of the Article XX environmental exception analysis, the Panel did
not analyze the third prong. The U.S. measures were read to be not justi-
fied under Articles XX(b) or XX(g).7 6 And, under XX(d), the Panel
found that because the primary embargo was inconsistent under Articles
III and XI, there was no justification for the intermediary embargo.
77
In analysis that sheds light upon the GATT's self-defined interpreta-
tion of its international standing, the Panel examined the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties78 in order to interpret the GATT in relation to
other international environmental agreements. In short, the Panel found
that most bilateral or plurilateral treaties were not relevant as a primary
means of interpreting the text of the GATT.79 This analysis, while not
technically incorrect, surprisingly implies that these international environ-
mental agreements are inconsequential.
Now that the formation of a global trade organization is on the verge
of reality,8 0 the precedent set in this decision could have highly significant
consequences. In particular, the Panel's concern that the bilateral and
plurilateral environmental agreements lacked all of the GATT members'
enlistment 8 ' leads to the rather dangerous implication that the GATT is
the supreme international agreement when any trade restriction is imple-
mented. If this is indeed the precedent the Panel is trying to set, serious
questions are raised about the structure of power between the proposed
World Trade Organization (WTO) and presently sovereign countries.
From a purely environmental perspective, the Tuna/Dolphin II deci-
sion is yet another example of international trade law's insensitivity toward
natural resource stewardship. The Panel's way of framing the issue as the
United States trying to use trade measures to force changes outside its own
jurisdiction shows that the GATT continues to be hostile toward unilateral,
or even regional, trade measures as levers of change. Alternatively, the
Id.
74. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53, para. 5.25.
75. Id. para. 5.26.
76. Id. paras. 5.27, 5.39.
77. Id. para. 5.41.
78. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention is
used for interpreting treaties. However, at least by U.S. ratification procedures, the
GATT' is not formally a treaty. Thus, not only is the Panel's application of the Vienna
Convention to the GATT legally questionable, but its attempt to have the GATT over-
ride other trade and environment treaties of undisputed legal status is doubly so.
79. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 53, para. 5.19.
80. See Final Agreement supra note 15.
81. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53, para. 5.19.
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U.S. position could be framed as the right of a sovereign state to answer
the demands of its consumers to buy only dolphin-safe tuna and to set
standards for the protection of natural resources and the environment.
Presumably, the main reason for negotiating and implementing trade
agreements is to avoid protectionism. Yet no country has claimed outright
that dolphin-safe tuna standards are protectionist. If protectionism is the
claim, then this should be the focus of the debate.
IV. "Like" Products: The Undefined Obstacle
To both tuna/dolphin panels, a fundamental problem with the MMPA
was that the United States was unfairly "discriminating" against Mexican
and EU yellowfin tuna, despite the fact that the United States has more
stringent tuna restrictions for its own nationals.8 2 While those who com-
municate in plain English might be confused by this assertion,8 3 it must be
remembered that the liberalized trade, which the GAIT seeks to promote,
is based upon a notion of economic efficiency that often belies lay person
reasoning.8 4 The goal, under this view, is to make products quickly, trans-
port and sell those products cheaply, and dispose of any waste hassle-free.
Probing environmental inquiries about production methods serve only to
block or to delay profits.8
Consequently, to a GATT bureaucrat primarily seeking to facilitate
the free flow of goods and services, non-discrimination has an especially
narrow meaning; it applies only to "like" products.8 6 If two shrimp plat-
ters have the same nutritional value and contain no contaminants, it is
presently GATr irrelevant that highly endangered sea turtles were killed
82. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3, paras. 5.9-5.16; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53,
paras. 5.6-5.10.
83. The word "[d]iscriminate" is defined as "to distinguish by discerning or expos-
ing differences." MERRIAN-WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1993).
84. For an alternative business view of trade and the environment, see RobertJ. Mor-
ris, A Business Perspective on Trade and the Environmen in TADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
121 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993).
85. Free traders also worry that trade distinctions based upon PPMs will lead to a
slippery slope of disguised protectionism or even "chaos." See GATr SECRETARIAT, supra
note 28; Jagdish Bhagwati, The Case for Free Trade, Sci. AM., Nov. 1993, at 42. This
response totally begs the question about formulating reasonable trade rules on PPMs
and other environmental concerns.
86. "Like products" are an integral part of two important GAT principles. First,
there is the most-favored-nation principle, which states that "any advantage, favor, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or des-
tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
GATr, supra note 14, art. I (emphasis added). Second, there is the principle of
national treatment which requires that "[t] he products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject,
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products." Id. art. III (emphasis
added). In other words, preferential treatment generally cannot be given to domestic
products over imported products.
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for one plate.8 7 If two truck loads of timber are of the same pliability and
size, it is GATT irrelevant that one load was felled by a large, unsustainable
clear-cut.8 8 If two fur coats are of equal quality and color, it is GATr irrel-
evant that one was harvested by a steel leg-hold trap, which causes needless
animal suffering and indiscriminate killing.8 9 The examples of this envi-
ronmentally limited and nonsensical approach to like products are virtu-
ally infinite, particularly in the area of natural resource protection.
90
Although it would seem practical to define products by their plain mean-
ing,9 1 for GAiT connoisseurs, it is not that simple.
87. See Department of Commerce Appropriations Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162,
103 Stat. 988 (1989).
88. See, e.g., Federal Law for the Labelling of Tropical Timber, BGB1. 309 (1992)
(Aus.), cited in Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann, Eco-Labelling Approaches for Tropical Tim-
ber: The Austrian Experience (background paper for the OECD Workshop on Life-
Cycle Management and Trade) (on file with author). This proposal was never imple-
mented. Although the Tuna/Dolphin Panel ruled that the U.S. dolphin-safe labelling
provision of the MMPA was GATT consistent, labelling requirements based on PPMs
are beginning to draw the attention of governments and business. See, e.g., UNITED
STATES COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 20, at I ("The increasing use
of eco-labelling can result in trade distortions if not brought under necessary discipline.
Eco-labelling schemes are, in a real sense, a PPM standard applied. unilaterally by the
country adopting the scheme."); VeenaJha & Simonetta Zarrilli, Ecolabelling Initiatives
as Potential Barriers to Trade-A Viewpoint from Developing Countries, July 20-21,
1993 (paper prepared for Informal Experts Workshop, OECD Environment Director-
ate) (on file with author).
89. The EU enacted a ban that would block the imports of fur obtained from ani-
mals trapped by leg-hold traps or methods which do not meet internationally agreed
humane trapping standards. See European Union Council, Regulation No. 3254/91,
O.J. (L.308) 1991 [hereinafter Steel Leg-Hold Trap]. This case exemplifies the com-
plexity of the entire PPM and trade and environment relationship. The EU wants to
overturn the U.S. MMPA provisions on dolphin-safe fishing in the name of free trade,
but it wants to block trade in order to save animals from needless suffering. The United
States wants to have its dolphin-safe provisions respected, but it does not want to abide
by the EU's humane trapping standards. Neither party appears free from economic
self-interest and hypocrisy. If the issue truly is differentiating disguised protectionism
and genuine environmental protection policies, neither party has aided in clarifying
the situation.
90. Perhaps the most glaring case for demonstrating the environmental difficulty in
distinguishing regulatory programs based on products and processes is the United
Nations' moratorium on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing. Large-scale Pelagic Dnft-net
Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A.
Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.2/46/L.7/Rev.1 (1991),
revised by U.N. Doc. A/C.2/46/L/7/Rev.2 (1991); see also High Seas Driftnet Enforce-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 102-582, 106 Stat. 4901 (1992); Wild Bird Conservation Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-440, 106 Stat. 2224 (1992); Pelly Amendment to Fishermen's Protective Act
of 1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988); The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3374 (1988). Simi-
larly, a tomato (or any other agricultural product) that has been grown with pesticides
and excess fertilizer should not be considered "like" a tomato that has not. See, e.g.,
Wendell Berry, Free Traders vs. Farmers, AmIcusJ., Fall 1993, at 31; Mark Ritchie, Agricul-
tural Trade Liberalization: Implications for Sustainable Agriculture, in THE CASE AGAINSr
FREE TRADE, supra note 23, at 163; J.H. Patterson, Trade Liberalization, Agricultural Policy,
and Wildlife: Reforming the Landscape, in NAFTA AND THE ENVIRoNmENT (Terry L. Ander-
son ed., 1993).
91. Even international treaties dealing with direct human threats are not immune
from the PPM foolery. Under present interpretations, a country could easily be found
to be violating the GATT if it blocks the importation of an appliance made with ozone-
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Tellingly, the GATr drafters did not have a precise definition for like
products. 9 2 Nevertheless, they did agree that the original International
Trade Organization (ITO) would have to make a study of the term and
arrive at a definition. 93 However, since the ITO never came into exist-
ence, the GATT has been functioning without a clear definition of like
products since its inception.
The 1970 GATT Working Party Report on "Border Tax Adjustments"
(Border Tax Report) found that because there was no conclusive defini-
tion of like or similar products, the interpretation of the term should be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 94 Over time, a history of reports and
panel decisions have emerged with certain criteria delineating like prod-
ucts, arguably without ever reaching consensus by all GATT parties.
A number of panels have relied on the use of tariff systems in defining
like products.95 In the case of Spain-Unroasted Coffee, the Panel found
that despite the classification chosen,96 Article I still required that like
depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). See Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987), adjusted and amended,
June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 539 (1990), adjusted and amended, Nov. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 875
(1993).
92. It was noted that "the expression had different meanings in different contexts."
GAIT Draft Charter, London, EPCT/CII/65, p. 2 [hereinafter GATI Draft Charter).
Moreover, the term had been used in commercial treaties for many years. EPCT/C.II/
PV.12, p.7. The Economic Committee of the League of Nations had suggested that
"like product" meant "practically identical with another product." EPCT/C.II/36, p.8.
Various examples of like product categorization were presented: wheat but not other
cereals, cars weighing less than 1500 kilos but not cars weighing more, and reliance on
systems of tariff classification. EPCT/C.II/PV.12, p.7; E/CONF.2/C.III/SR5, p.4 .
93. See, eg. id., EPCT/C.II/65 p. 3, EPCT/C.II/PV.12 p. 7.
94. Suggested factors to consider were the "product's end-uses in a given market;
consumers' tastes and habits, which change from country to country;, the product's
properties, nature and quality...." GATIT, ANALICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATF LAw
AND PRAcricE 141 (6th ed. 1994) [hereinafter ANALncAL INDEX].
95. See, e.g., Report of the Working Party on The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium
Sulphate, GAT" Doc. GAIT/CP.4/39 (Apr. 3, 1950), B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 2d Supp.
188, para. 8 (1952) [hereinafter Ammonium Sulphate]; EEC-Measures on Animal Feed Pro-
teins, Report of the Pane B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 25th Supp. 49, paras. 4.1-4.2 (1979) [here-
inafter EEC-Animal Feed], (finding, inter alia, that despite the same end-use for which
the proteins were employed, they could not be considered like products due to "the
varying protein contents and the different animal, vegetable, and synthetic origins of
the protein products...." Spain-Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, Report of the Panel
B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 28th Supp. 102, paras. 4.4-4.10 passim (1982) [hereinafter Spain-
Unroasted Coffee] (discussed infra notes 96, 104); Canada/Japan: Tariff on Imports of
Spruce, Pine, Fir (SP9) Dimension Lumber, Report of the Panel; B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 36th
Supp. 167, para. 3.17 (1990) [hereinafter SPFReport] (discussed infra notes 100, 110);
Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Bever-
ages, Report of the Pane B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 34th Supp. 83, para. 5.5 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Japan-Alcoholic Beverages] (discussed infra notes 99, 104, and 108-10).
96. "The Panel found that there was no obligation under the GATr to follow any
particular system for classifying goods, and that a contracting party had the right to
introduce in its customs tariff new positions or subpositions as appropriate." Spain-
Unroasted Coffee, supra note 95, paras. 4.4-4.10. Spain had divided unroasted coffee into
five tariff classifications. ANALyrcAL INDEx, supra note 94, at 37.
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products have the same tariff treatment.9 7 On the other hand, products
grouped under the same classification may not be like products, but
rather related products. Nonetheless, there continue to be examples
where products seem to have been listed in different tariff categories by
PPM characteristics.
9 8
Other panels, including both tuna/dolphin panels, have depended
on the physical characteristics and end-uses of the products to define like
products.9 9 However, as has already been discussed, end-uses or physical
properties alone will not and should not always determine whether the
products are like products. 10 0 Furthermore, the EC representative on the
EEC Animal Feed Panel argued that price could be a factor in defining
like products.1° 1 The Panel did not comment on this point, however, leav-
ing unresolved the possibility of whether price could be used as a factor in
distinguishing among products which had different costs due to the extent
of environmentally sustainable methods involved in their production.
10 2
Another extremely interesting example, argued by Japan in the SPF
Report, is the idea of product differentiation based on consumer percep-
tion. 10 3 The SPF case is not the only report that has referred to consumer
97. ANALYrrCAL INDEX, supra note 94, at 37. In this way, discrimination stemming
from specially created categories could be prevented.
98. See Rene Vossenaar & VeenaJha, UNGTAD, Environmentally Based Process and
Production Method Standards: Some Implications for Developing Countries (Apr. 22,
1994) (paper prepared for OECD Workshop on "Trade and Environment: PPM's
Issues") (on file with author). The Customs Cooperation Council has in the past estab-
lished separate tariff headings, such as handicrafts and hand loom cloth, which in some
cases have been based on criteria which could be considered as PPM-related.
99. See, e.g., United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Report of
the Pane; B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 34th Supp. 136, para. 5.1.1. (1988) (the domestic and
imported products were either identical or served substantially identical end-uses in the
market); EEC-Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, Report of the Pane B.I.S.D., supra
note 3, 27th Supp. 98, para. 4.4 (1981) [hereinafter Chile Apples] (Chilean apples were
an agricultural product and although of different varieties, were "a like product" to EC
apples.); Japan-Aloholic Beverages, supra note 95, para. 5.5 (the alcoholic beverages
were like products in terms of Article III because of their similar properties, end-uses,
and uniform tariff classification).
100. See SPFReport, supra note 95, para. 3.19-3.20. This Panel found that the Cana-
dian dimension lumber was not like other processed lumber. Japan successfully argued
that the end-uses in construction were different, the dimension lumber came from dif-
ferent species with different physical properties, and there was no universal tariff classi-
fication for dimension lumber.
101. EEC-Animal Feed supra note 95, para. 3.4.
102. This possibility is a kind of variation on the concept of border tax adjustments.
Border tax adjustments encourage sustainable production by equalizing the cost differ-
entiation at the border between products that are produced by environmentally sustain-
able methods and products that are not. See Raoul Stewardson, Climate Change,
Carbon Taxes and Border Tax Adjustments (Apr. 6, 1994) (on file with author). Price
differentiation would first distinguish products by their production costs and then, by
categorizing them as "unlike products," give them different treatment under GATT
Articles I and III.
103. See SPF Report, supra note 95, para. 3.52. The Japanese representative argued
that consumers perceived dimension lumber differently from other lumber and that
this consumer perception was an important factor in determining "likeness."
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perception. 10 4 However, no panel has directly addressed the possibility
that consumer perception could be used to differentiate between prod-
ucts. Yet consumer taste and habits, which change from country to coun-
try, were factors the GATI Border Tax Report listed in its criteria for
defining like products. 10 5 The controversy over dolphin-unsafe tuna and
the consequent labelling of cans in the United States, for instance, demon-
strated that American consumers perceive a distinction between tuna har-
vested in a dolphin-safe manner and tuna that is not.10 6 Considering that
a basic purpose of trade is to bring desired products to consumers, it fol-
lows that consumers should be able to choose not only which products to
buy but also how to differentiate among those products.'
0 7
TheJapan-Alcoholic Beverages Panel affirmed the idea that the term
like products needed to be defined within the context of the particular
trade provision in question. Under GATT Article III, the Panel sought to
determine whether the imported and domestic products were "like" or
"directly competitive or substitutable"' 08 and whether the internal taxa-
tion or regulation discriminated against imported products.' 0 9 However,
the Panel dismissed, as too narrow, the interpretation of like products as
meaning "more or less the same products" and found Japan's provisions
GATT-inconsistent.110
104. See, eg., Spain-Unroasted Coffee, supra note 95, par. 3.8 (Consumers' prefer-
ence for various types of coffee was well established.); Chile Apples, supra note 99, para.
3.10 (Chilean apples were bought by selective consumers ready to pay a premium for
them.);Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 95, para. 3.10 (Japan argued that certain
traditional alcohol had lower social status, whereas western alcohol had higher social
status.).
105. ANALYrIcAL INDEx, supra note 94.
106. See The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act 1990, Pub. L. 101-627,
104 Stat. 4465, § 901(b) (3) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1385(b) (3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(stating that "the Congress finds that... consumers would like to know if the tuna they
purchase is falsely labelled as to the effect of the harvesting of the tuna on dolphins").
107. This conception of trade as a means to consumer welfare may not be universal.
See Karel van Wolferen, No Chance-East and West Trade Won't Meet WAsH. PosT, June 26,
1994, at C3 (positing that forJapan, trade is a vehicle to national power). If this incom-
patibility between countries' conceptions of trade is accurate, then the logjam over
trade and environment reflects fundamental divisions over the purpose of trade liberali-
zation and the meaning of sustainable development. Meanwhile, the GATr continues
to make determinations as to whether countries' policies are "discriminatory" without
taking into account any of these incompatibilities.
108. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 95, paras. 5.1-5.6. An example of directly
competitive or substitutable products is where one country has a domestic apple indus-
try but no domestic orange industry, and the country heavily taxes imported oranges
(oranges and apples not being like products). The consequence is that the tax protects
the domestic apple industry from foreign orange competition. ANALYrIcAL INDEX, supra
note 94, at 145. Thus, while the GATT distinguishes between "directly competitive or
substitutable products" and "like products," the products are usually treated the same
under Article III to prevent domestic industry protection. See Ammonium Sulphate, supra
note 95, para. 8.
109. "The drafting history confirms that Article 111:2 was designed with 'the intention
that internal taxes on goods should not be used as a means of protection.'" Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 95, para. 5.5 (emphasis added).
110. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 95, para. 5.5. In the SPF Report, Canada
argued that because Articles I and III set out trade-creating obligations, a narrow defini-
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Similarly, the 1992 Beer II Panel examined two U.S. measures within
the context of Article Ill."' Under the first provision in question, where
different wines were taxed at different rates, the Panel determined that in
interpreting like products under Article III "it is necessary to consider
whether such product differentiation is being made so as to afford protec-
tion to domestic products."1" 2 Under the second measure, which devised
different regulatory schemes for low alcohol and high alcohol beer, the
Panel did not find that the different schemes were discriminatory."13
Some panel decisions appear to allow GATT contracting parties to
focus on solutions to environmental or PPM problems without regard to
overly rigid trade rules. The German Sardines Panel, for instance, based
its decision on previous negotiations between the parties. 1 4 Such reason-
ing suggests that.the use of bilateral or plurilateral agreements to define
like products for the particular agreement may be a constructive option to
explore."15 In addition, neither the language in Article HI nor in previous
panel decisions indicates that a country's domestic regulations relating to
a PPM cannot be a constructive factor in defining like products. As the
Beer II Panel stated:
the treatment of imported and domestic products as like products under
Article III may have significant implications for the scope of obligations
under the General Agreement and for the regulatory autonomy of con-
tracting parties with respect to their internal tax laws and regulations: once
products are designated as like products, a regulatory product differentia-
tion, e.g. for standardization or environmental purposes, becomes inconsis-
tion of like products would not be appropriate. In a classic example of convoluted
GATT reasoning, the Panel said, "The concept [of like product] itself would have to
allow for a degree of difference while maintaining the sense of likeness." SPF Report
supra note 95, par. 3.38.
111. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, Report of the Pane4
B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 39th Supp. 206, paras. 5.23-5.26 (1993) [hereinafter Beer11Panel].
112. Id. para. 5.25. The particular grape variety in question grows only in the United
States and the Mediterranean. The United States, it was found, did not proffer any
public policy reason for the tax, and the Panel found it to be protectionist and discrimi-
natory towards the Canadian like product. Id.
113. The Panel found that although the physical characteristics of the beers were
similar, the regulatory burden weighed equally on both domestic and imported beers.
Moreover, despite some overlap, the consumer target market was discernably different.
The Panel also considered the public policy goals of protecting human life and health
and public morals, as well as the legislative background, where the focus of the drafters
may have been to raise a new source of revenue. Id. paras. 5.71-5.74.
114. Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, Report of the Pane B.I.S.D., supra note
3, 1st Supp. 53, para. 12 (1953). This Panel did not determine whether different prepa-
rations of the clupeoid family constituted separate products, but it found that Germany
had treated the preparations of the fish as separate products during negotiations.
115. In the context of distinguishing products by PPMs, there are certain advantages
to this approach. For countries that are similarly situated, and even for countries that
are not, it may be easier to negotiate an agreement that incorporates an appropriate
standard of PPMs, taking into account the countries' economic and technological capa-
bilities. However, while the 1952 German Sardines Panel willingly deferred to the par-
ties' prior negotiations, the 1994 Tuna/Dolphin II Panel was not nearly as deferential
in its interpretation of the relationship between the GATIr and other multilateral agree-
ments. See supra part III.
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tent with Article III even if the regulation is not "applied ...so as (to]
afford protection to domestic production." In the view of the Panel, therefore, it
is imperative that the lihe product determination in the context of Article III be made
in such a way that it not unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory authority and
domestic policy options of contracting parties.116
The authors find this statement to be an eminently fair starting point for a
major re-evaluation of Article III.
Although the panel decisions show that there is no one criterion or
even a combination of criteria that defines a like product, there is a dis-
turbing trend to interpret the term quite expansively. Yet the issue should
not really be a matter of defining the term broadly or narrowly but rather
deciding the policy purposes behind the like product concept. Previous
Article III panel decisions themselves demonstrate a number of trade
mechanisms capable of distinguishing products based on unsustainable
PPMs: tax and pricing systems, tariff schedules, consumer perceptions,
and international agreements. In addition, there exists the gnawing ques-
tion of why like product analysis must exclude PPM considerations when
there is no language in the GATI that prohibits PPM trade measures and
when kindergarten logic dictates that physically similar products are not
always alike.
V. Article XX: Making Environmental Law by Exception
Another potential mechanism for allowing sensible trade restrictions is
GATr Article XX,117 which provides exceptions to basic trade rules such
as non-discrimination. Although Article XX does not explicitly mention
the word "environment," two clauses undeniably address environmentally-
based trade measures: those "necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health" and those "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natu-
ral resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.""18 The only limit to
Article XX-at least apparent from a plain reading of the text-is that the
trade restriction in question may not "constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." 1 9 Because of
the relatively broad language of Article XX, many commentators have
116. Beer H Pane supra note 111, para. 5.72 (emphasis added).
117. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XX (General Exceptions).
118. Id. art. XX (b), (g) (emphasis added). Article XX also allows measures neces-
sary to protect public morals, measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations "not inconsistent" with the GATI, measures relating to the products of
prison labor (a non-environmental PPM), and measures imposed for the protection of
"national treasures." Id. In addition, Article XXI provides exceptions for "essential
security interests." Id. art. XXI.
119. Id. art. XX. It is plausible to argue that the term "where the same conditions
prevail" means that countries with different environmental "conditions" can justify weak
or unsustainable environmental standards. Yet for trade to be as sustainable as the
WTO claims it will be, certain trade restrictions based on legitimate environmental con-
cerns must be permitted. WTO Agreemen4 supra note 15.
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urged that PPM measures can and should fall within its gambit. 1 20
Aside from the philosophical objection to relegating serious environ-
mental concerns into a trade exception, 12 1 the use of Article XX to main-
tain national sovereignty over PPM trade measures raises several practical
problems. First, while the Tuna/Dolphin II Panel found that Article XX
did not restrict a country from applying conservation measures to protect
natural resources outside its own territorial jurisdiction, it still found that
the use of import embargoes by the United States was not covered by Arti-
cle XX exceptions and placed heavy emphasis on "the right of access to
markets." 1 22 While it is clear that both tuna/dolphin panels frowned
upon import embargoes, 123 it is not clear what, if any, trade measures
would have been deemed acceptable.'
2 4
In addition, the term "necessary" in Article XX has been interpreted
to mean "least trade restrictive" or "least inconsistent with GATr" by sev-
eral panels.12 5 These market dominated definitions not only emasculate
the plain meaning of Article XX, but also threaten any acceptable overall
balance between trade and the environment by totally dismissing the polit-
ical difficulties of passing effective environmental legislation.' 2 6 Finally,
120. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article
XX 25J. Wom.D TRADE 37 (1991).
121. Some have similarly suggested that certain environmental concerns could be
addressed by the waiver provision in GAIT Article XXV. See, e.g., John H. Jackson,
World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE
E VIRONMENT, supra note 84, at 219, 228.
122. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 53, paras. 5.20, 5.26, 5.42.
123. Import bans related to a repugnant or reprehensible environmental practice
run counter to the GATT's general prohibition against quantitative restrictions because
zero is considered a quantity. See GAIT, supra note 14, art. XI ("No prohibitions or
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained
by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party.. . ."); see also Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3, para. 5.18; Tuna/Dolphin
I, supra note 53, para. 5.10.
124. There have been seven GAT panel reports where Article XX(b) and (g) excep-
tions have been raised, none of which have been successful. Of the seven, only four
disputes seem to raise legitimate environmental concerns. See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra
note 3; Tuna/Dolphin HI, supra note 53; Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Inter-
nal Taxes on Cigarettes, Report of the Pane4 B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 37th Supp. 200 (1991)
[hereinafter Thai Cigarettes]; Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, Report of the Pane4 B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 35th Supp. 98 (1989) [hereinafter
Canada-Salmon]. The trade measures employed by the challenged countries ranged
from import embargoes in Tuna/Dolphin I and II, to import restrictions and licensing
requirements in Thai Cigarettes, and to prohibited exports or sale of the products in
Canada-Salmon.
125. See, e.g., Tuna/Dolphin , supra note 53; Thai Cigarettes, supra note 124.
126. See, e.g., CHARLEs ARDEN-CIARKE, WORLDWIDE FuuN FOR NATURE (WWF), NECES-
sriy AND PROPORTIONALITY-THE SEARCH FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL DEFINITION, (June
1992) (critiquing the European Community's submission to the GAT Working Group
on Environmental Measures and International Trade, GAT Doc. TRE/W/5, Nov. 17,
1992). In fact, one of the environmental community's main objections to the Uruguay
Round centers upon a disagreement over the interpretation of the "trade restrictive"
tests. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitay Measures, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA II-AIA-4, para. 21 (Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Agreement supra note 15 ("least
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GATT panels have determined that the country utilizing Article XX excep-
tions bears the burden of proof, and this principle has been adopted by
the Council.'
2 7
If the Article XX roadblocks erected by the GATT are stripped of
their technicalities, it is fairly obvious that the GATT panel antipathy
toward PPM trade measures is the root problem. The "like" product
requirement and the Article XX baggage are merely flip sides of the same
outdated PPM coin. But the GATT's treatment of Article XX-the only
place where environmental protection is even remotely considered by the
GATT-more starkly exposes the naked irrationality of present trade
rules.
Environmental degradation, which knows no political boundaries,
often occurs precisely because of the trade that the GAIT promotes. It is
occurring fast enough without being shackled by procedural burdens.
Dirty air from a Mexican power plant near the United States, for instance,
does not magically stop at the U.S. border.128 Species extinction can be
directly related to the financial investments spurred by the sometimes
unsustainable export-driven growth protected, if not promoted, by trade
agreements. 129 Areas owned by no country, such as the high seas, are not
better protected by making cautious countries pay for the right to con-
serve their natural resources.' 3 0 The sobering reality of present environ-
mental threats dictates that countries look outside their borders for
potential solutions, irrespective of whether trading patterns are dis-
rupted.' 3 1 Environmental considerations must sit at the table when trade
rules are negotiated, not confined to the periphery as a feel-good
exception.
trade restrictive" test); TBTAgreement, supra note 18, art. 2.2 ("not be more trade-restric-
tive than necessary" test).
127. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3, para. 5.22. "[T]he practice of panels has been to
interpret Article XX narrowly, to place the burden on the party invoking Article XX to
justify its invocation." I. This rule actually may not be unreasonable. Instead, it dem-
onstrates the danger of pigeonholing environmental protection into a trade exception.
128. See, e.g., Andy Pasztor, U.S., Mexican Officials Plan to Create Air-Pollution Zone for
Border Residents, WALL ST.J., Sept. 10, 1993, atA4 (discussing potential solutions to Mex-
ico's "Carbon II" power plant).
129. Liberal trade can greatly exacerbate each of the four main factors which cause
loss of species diversity: (1) loss of habitat, (2) pollution, (3) direct harvesting, and (4)
the introduction of exotic species. See generally EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE Drwasrrv OF
LIFE (1992); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SERLE/10/Supp. (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818; Boyce Rensberger, Ecology: Tropical
Forest Cycle Appears to Accelerate; WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1994, at A2 (global emissions of
carbon dioxide influence natural forest cycles).
130. For areas no country owns, such as the high seas, the upper atmosphere, and
Antarctica, "freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968).
131. "Trade should thus not be seen just as an aspect of economic development, to
be managed only by economists, but as the essential flux of materials and information
that are increasingly integrating our world into a single global human system." Arthur
Dahli, Global Sustainability and Its Implementation for Trade, 1993 (on file with
author).
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VI. An Aging Philosophy: The Theory of Comparative Advantage
There is no shortage of explanations as to why legitimate environmental
considerations are still knocking on trade's front door. At one extreme,
some environmentalists claim that corporate-driven free traders are con-
sciously seeking to manipulate trade rules to avoid established regulatory
standards.' 3 2 Conversely, many free trade disciples defend the present sys-
tem, claiming that environmentally based trade rules will create a slippery
slope for disguised protectionism and will threaten national sovereignty by
making it subservient to natural resource protection.'
3 3
While both of these trade/environment extremes probably possess a
kernel of truth, the real culprit might just be confusion as to what "free
trade" actually is. To listen to most mainstream newspapers and politi-
cians who regularly extol the virtues of open markets, one gets the impres-
sion that free trade enables John and Jane Average from Main Street,
U.S.A., to sell their homemade wares in shops around the world.
Whatever the economic benefits of multilateral trade deals,13 4 this cozy
impression is fundamentally incorrect.'3 5
Interestingly, despite the growing awareness that the traditional post-
World War II economic paradigm serves neither the economy nor the
environment,13 6 leading economists continue to pay homage to a 19th
century doctrine that literally dominates contemporary thinking about lib-
eralized trade.' 3 7 The theory of comparative advantage basically posits
that a country makes products (i.e., engages in a specific PPM) which best
suit it-both with regard to other countries and within its own country. In
a simple example, if Japan is good at making VCRs but not equipped to
grow bananas, and Ecuador is good at growing bananas but not well suited
132. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Introduction: Free Trade and the Decline of Democracy, in THE
CASE AGArNsT FREE TRADE, supra note 23, at 1; David Morris, Free Trade: The Great
Destroyer, in id. at 139-57.
133. See, e.g., Bhagwati, supra note 85.
134. See, e.g., Alan Deardorff, Economic Effects of the Uruguay Round: Estimates
from the Literature, July 6, 1994 (paper presented at The Brookings Institution) (on
file with author). Deardorff concludes that "the quantifiable effects of the Uruguay
Round are positive but somewhat small." Id.
135. See Drucker, supra note 24; LANo & Hr,.s, supra note 25. While different con-
clusions are drawn from each of these sources, both agree that the globalization of the
economy is rapidly and radically changing the way humans interact with each other and
with the natural environment. See also Thomas L. Friedman, Whlien Money Talks, Govern-
ments Listen, N.Y. TiMEs, July 24, 1994, at D3 (discussing the effects of a daily $1 trillion
trade in global currencies).
136. For an excellent description of the changes gripping the world's economy, see
DALY & COBB, supra note 5. Much of the discussion in this section is drawn from the
work of Herman Daly, who raises questions about sustainability that proponents of free
trade are either unwilling or unable to answer.
137. See, e.g., Low, supra note 15, at 146 ("If one were to try to identify the theoretical
underpinning of the GATT, it would certainly be articulated around the theory of com-
parative advantage ... ."); see also KRUGMAN, supra note 5, at 230 ("Comparative advan-
tage turns out to be an idea that many self-styled experts fail to understand."). We
agree by noting that Krugman virtually ignores natural resource conservation and the
concept of sustainable development in his most recent work.
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to produce VCRs, then these two countries should and will trade with each
other for maximum efficiency.
In many ways, the theory of comparative advantage is merely an
extension of Adam Smith's individual-driven capitalism, where the division
of labor is linked to available markets.' 38 Without sustainable controls,
unbridled comparative advantage dictates that each country should pos-
sess the sovereign right to exploit or even abuse its resources as a basis for
efficiency.' 3 9 But all PPMs are not created equal. Just as the practical and
political limits of capitalism have been accepted by the advent of national
antitrust, social security, food safety, and environmental laws, so too there
must be necessary limits to the doctrine of comparative advantage and
"free trade." In the context of trade law and PPMs, unsustainable produc-
tion methods should at least not become the basis of any advantage
40 -
comparative, competitive, or otherwise.
In any event, unlike the formal doctrine where countries magically
trade with each other, it is multinational corporations and private individ-
uals who perform the vast majority of world commerce.' 41 The primary
drivers in private trade, capital, labor, and technology are no longer con-
fined to the country of export or import. Today, the "comparative advan-
tage" that allows VCRs to be made profitably in Japan can be transferred to
many other countries, or maybe it can even be kept in Japan with non-
Japanese ownership. 142 Capital simply seeks its absolute highest rate of
return, often irrespective of nationality and blind to good faith environ-
mental practices.'
43
138. See ADAm SMITH, THE WEALTH oF NATIONS (1776).
139. Although there have been no GATT disputes on point, it is quite possible that
existing interpretations of Article III (product non-discrimination) and Article XI (gen-
eral prohibition against quantitative restrictions) could make it GATr-illegal to regulate
exports of vital natural resources such as timber and water. GATI', supra note 14. For
instance, NAFTA, which generally incorporates GATT articles by reference, specifically
excludes raw logs from the prohibition against such export bans or limits. NAFTA,
supra note 14, art. 309, Annex 301.3. No such NAFTA exception exists for water. See
generally, Steven Shrybman, International Trade and the Environmen4 20 EcoLoGIST 30, 31
(1990).
140. See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration]; Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED), Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.I (1992) [hereinafter
Agenda 21].
141. See generally ROBERT REIcH, TiH WoRK OF NATrONS (1992). But see Agreement on
Government Procurement, GAIT Doc. MTN/FA II-A4(b), (Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Agree-
ment, supra note 15 (referring to the current text, Agreement on Government Procurement,
B.I.S.D., supra note 3, 26th Supp. 33 (1980) and to the revised text, GATT Doc. GPR/
Spec/77 (Dec. 15, 1993)).
142. "By several calculations, some Japanese cars are more American than those
made in Detroit." Too Latefor Champions, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 5, 1994, at 14.
143. Some claim that environmental costs are not a primary cause for businesses to
relocate. See, e.g., Patrick Low & AlexanderYeats, DoDirty Industries Migrate?, in INTERNA-
TioNAL TRADE Asm THE ENRONMFNwr 89 (Patrick Low ed., 1992). Yet persistent anecdo-
tal evidence, as well as business' general complaints about environmental regulation,
indicates that environmental costs play a significant part in corporate business loca-
tions. See, e.g., William S. Ferguson, Note, International Implications ofPollution Control 58
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The implication of capital mobility on the global environment is
profound. 1 " Not all countries are willing or able to regulate environmen-
tal threats caused by damaging PPMs, particularly those countries starving
for investment capital. 145 Local politicians of all stripes understandably
become starved for investment. Furthermore, in a world where there are
now increasingly fewer environmentally related actions that can be called
wholly "domestic," evidence suggests that the earth cannot sustain devel-
oped-style growth in lesser-developed countries, 146 even assuming that
developed-country-dominated multinational corporations are generally
benevolent entities that spread environmentally friendly production meth-
ods. The accepted Ricardo notion of comparative advantage1 47 looks
rather incongruous when compared to any notion of sustainability.
A potential avenue out of this eco-traffic jam is to turn toward the
"free" market which created it148 but with the appropriate incorporation
of environmental costs spawned by a PPM.1 4 9 Until an accepted national
accounting system that adequately reflects environmental costs is adopted,
the only recourse is for countries unilaterally to capture environmental
costs in a given transaction. Traditional free-traders, however, immedi-
ately balk at such proposals because of their protectionist potential and
the uncertain nature of the calculation of environmental costs.1 50 Coun-
tervailing and anti-dumping duty mechanisms, quite common in non-envi-
ronmental sectors, are among the compensating options most frequently
cited.' 51 Aside from those PPMs that are so repugnant or objectionable
CORNELL L. REV. 368 (1973); Duane Chapman, Environmental Costs and NAFTA: Testi-
mony, U.S. International Trade Commission Hearing, in CORNELL AGRICuLvuRAL ECONOMICS
STrF PAPER 4 (Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., Dec.
1992).
144. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 143; REicH, supra note 141; DALY & COBB, supra
note 5; Drucker, supra note 24; LANG & HINms, supra note 25.
145. Some have advocated that at the very least, the United States should require
U.S. owned corporations to abide by U.S. environmental standards, including those
governing PPMs, when operating abroad. See, e.g., Alan Neff, Not In Their Backyards,
Either A Proposal for a Foreign Environmental Practices Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990).
146. This is partly the classic problem of, "Do as I say, not as I do." But given that
natural resources are finite, and assuming that human technology cannot indefinitely
overcome this fact, developed countries have an obligation to control their own produc-
tion and consumption habits and to aid developing countries in achieving sustainable
economic growth. See, e.g., Herman Daly, The Perils of Free Trade, Sci. AM. 50-57 (1993);
Mahathir Mohammed, End the North's Eco-Imperialism, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1992, at B7.
The key, well beyond the scope of this paper, is to craft a new notion of economic
development.
147. See RICARDO, supra note 5.
148. Considering the large number of environmental and other social externalities
involved in any "free" transaction, "[n]o one is really free unless everyone is bound by
laws that are just." ANDREW BARD ScHmooKLFR, THE ILLUSION OF CHOICE 280 (1993).
Wealth from a certain transaction, conversely, "goes to those who satisfy the wants of
wealth." Id. at 47.
149. See, e.g., Robert Repetto, Accounting for Environmental Assets, Sc. AM, June 1992,
at 94-100; Grossly Distorted Picture ECONOMISr, Feb. 5, 1994, at 71.
150. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 84; Bhagwati, supra note 85.
151. See generally GATT, supra note 14, art. VI ("Anti-dumping and Countervailing
Duties"), art. XIV ("Exceptions to the Rule of Non-Discrimination"), art. XVI ("Subsi-
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that all trade is simply cut off, the vast majority of environmentally threat-
ening production methods could and should reflect the public cost of nat-
ural resource degradation.'
5 2
This is not to say that all PPMs are environmentally harmful and
deserve tariffs, duties, or product bans. It is worth repeating that not all
PPMs are created equal. To the contrary, trade can increase wealth which
in turn can increase environmental protection and utilization of sustaina-
ble PPMs.
153
Trade can also foster environmentally friendly PPMs and products which
would otherwise not be available.' 5 4 In one example that received consid-
erable attention during the NAFTA debate, trade can promote the export
of environmental technologies, and the goods and services made with
those technologies, from countries with relatively high standards (e.g., the
United States) to countries seeking to raise or enforce their own standards
(e.g., Mexico). 155
dies"); International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1991) [hereinafter International Pollution Deterrence Act]. This bill, introduced by
Senator Boren (D-OK), would have set a duty equal to the cost which would be incurred
by the producer of the foreign article if the foreign government imposed the same
environmental standards in existence for U.S. producers. Id. See also ALBERT GORE,
EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 343 (1992).
Just as government subsidies of a particular industry are sometimes considered
unfair under the trade laws, weak and ineffectual enforcement of pollution con-
trol measures should be included in the definition of unfair trading practices
.... The mixture of environmental protection with trade negotiations is vola-
tile, but so is any other consideration with trade talks.
Id.
152. See, e.g., Guiding Principles Concerning International Fconomic Aspects of Environmen-
tal Policies (Polluter Pays Principle), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) Doc. C(72)128 (May 26, 1972). However, the Polluter Pays Principle
rejects the use of unilateral duties to offset externalized environmental costs.
153. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); GENE
GROSSMAN & ALAN KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAcrS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AOREEMENr (1992). But despite the necessity of financial resources for certain
levels of environmental protection, resources alone are not sufficient. A history of envi-
ronmental regulation reveals hard fought and uncertain political struggles in achieving
desirable ends. See, e.g., STEPHEN Fox, JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY. THE AMERICAN CON-
SERVATION MOVEMENT (1981).
154.
For instance, villagers in the Dominican Republic use photovoltaic cells
shipped in from the United States to light their homes. As recently as 1990,
Greenpeace magazine imported paper from a Swedish mill because no U.S. facil-
ity could supply paper produced with a chlorine-free bleaching system. And
fuel-efficient Japanese cars reduced air emissions in the United States and
forced U.S. manufacturers to develop more fuel-efficient models during the
seventies.
Hilary F. French, Reconciling Trade and the Environment, in STATE OF THE WORLD 158
(Lester R. Brown ed., 1993).
155. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), DEVELOP-
MENT ASSISTANCE, EXPORT PROMOTION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY (Background
Paper, 1993); Letter from Chris Marcich, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources, to Donald Connors, Chairman, Environmental Busi-
ness Council and Rodger Schlickeisen, President, Defenders of Wildlife (Sept. 24,
1993) (regarding the use of environmental industry expertise as part of the dispute
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The key to environmentally sound trade is not to restrict the flow of
goods and services in a knee-jerk fashion, but to examine what is currently
known about trade's environmental implications. Economic output is no
longer solely based, as it was in the nineteenth and first half of the twenti-
eth centuries, upon industrial production and relative immobility.
156
Consequently, we desperately need a fresh look at the theory of compara-
tive advantage that recognizes the stress on global natural resources, as
well as the importance of human education and thoughtful infrastructure
development.' 5 7 Ironically, there exists a growing body of value-adding
production methods and technologies which are either neutral or benefi-
cial to the global environment.158 But for those PPMs that remain envi-
ronmentally "harmful," the suffocating grip of comparative advantage
must be substantially loosened if sustainable trade is to become more than
an ivory tower pipedream.
VII. Participatory Democracy. A Missing Link in Trade
159
Even the best formulated theories in the world will inevitably fail if local,
national, and global citizens do not have a meaningful say in the policies
that shape their lives.' 6 0 Of all the disturbing aspects surrounding the
tuna/dolphin decision, perhaps the most troubling was the GATT panel's
disregard for the twenty year political process and effort that had gone
into establishing a dolphin-safe tuna policy.161 This fact largely explains
the outrage about the panel decision expressed by dolphin conservation-
ists toward the unelected and unaccountable GATr institutional
machinery.
settlement mechanism in the environmental supplement with Mexico and Canada) (on
file with author).
156. See, e.g., REICH, supra note 141, at 82. Nonetheless, as Reich himself acknowl-
edges, the transition to "high-value" production in the developed world has meant sig-
nificant "high volume" production in LDCs. Id.
157. Of the three essential elements of a national economy-human education, nat-
ural resources, infrastructure (capital, roads, buildings, equipment)-only natural
resources are inherently a factor in determining a country's "comparative advantage."
Although natural resource exploitation is often the surest way to short-term competitive
(and comparative) advantage, PPM trade restrictions in this area may be less problem-
atic to developing countries, and less prone to protectionism, than industrial PPM stan-
dards. This area is ripe for considerable research. See generally DALY & COBB, supra note
5; DAN Esry, GREENING THE GATT 159 (1994).
158. For example, in 1992 world exports of commercial services amounted to $1
trillion, which was over one-fifth of all world exports and represented a 12% increase
from 1991. World Trade in Commercial Services, 199Z ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1994, at 113.
159. "The best cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy." EDwARD ABBEY, A
VOICE CRYING IN THE WILDERNESS 21 (1989).
160. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DrILER, RusstA AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 113 (1993). In
reforming the former Soviet Union, one of Gorbachev's fundamental aims (demokra-
tizatsia) for the Soviet people was to allow them to "once again take charge of their own
destinies." Id.
161. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3, para. 6.1. "The Panel wished to underline that
its task... did not call for a finding on the appropriateness of the United States' and
Mexico's conservation policies as such." Id.
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Indeed, fundamental accountability problems run through both the
negotiation and the implementation of trade agreements like the GAIT.
For starters, environmental assessments of trade agreements should pre-
cede the conclusion of all such agreements. 162 Once signed and opera-
tive, the agreement's dispute settlement procedures should promote
openness and access to environmental expertise.'6 3 If trade agreements
facilitated and did not hinder democratic openness, domestic laws
enacted through publicly accountable political processes would more
likely be afforded appropriate deference.'6
VIII. Global PPM Leadership
Much has been made in the post-Cold War era of the United States' rela-
tive economic and military dominance. But most impressive is the tri-
umph of American democracy. Despite its fits, starts, and occasional
excesses, there probably exists no system as rigorous in its quest for public
accountability. 165 If U.S. democratic leadership in the world is accepted,
then it will necessarily fall on the shoulders of the U.S. government and
people to advance an environmental agenda-centered on the pivotal
PPM dilemma-in international trade fora like the GATT.
The problem, however, is that much of the world remains skeptical of
either the need to integrate trade and the environment or U.S. leadership
or unilateralism on the issue. 166 This will probably have a chilling effect
162. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1988); Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, No. 95-5212 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 24, 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 685; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
Amendment, H.R. 3219, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (bill to amend NEPA to clarify
the application of that Act to extraterritorial actions of the Federal Government);
Trade and Environment Reporting Act of 1991, H.R. 4734, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994) (bill to mandate environmental assessments within the U.S. Trade Act); CuN.
TON ADMINISTRATION, THE NAFrA: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL IssuEs (1993). In addi-
tion, some have called for multilateral environmental assessments of trade agreements,
either by an international environmental organization or an environmental committee
within the WTO. See, e.g., ESTy, supra note 157, at 207-10.
163. Although the proposed Uruguay Round agreement and the recently passed
NAFTA allow the use of environmental experts during dispute settlement proceedings
(a novelty that the Tuna/Dolphin I Panel could have used considering the several key
factual errors it made), the provisions fail to meet even a minimalist democratic test
Under both agreements, citizens can neither appear before nor submit information to
dispute panels. Citizens also cannot see country pleadings and can even be prevented
from seeing the final decision if both parties to a dispute so agree. See generally Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, GATT Doc. MTN/FA
II-A2 (Dec. 15, 1993), in Final Agreement supra note 15; NAFTA, supra note 14, ch. 20.
164. See, e.g., William Greider, The Global Marketplace: A Closet Dictator, in THE CASE
AcANsr FREF TRADE, supra note 23, at 195.
165. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988), which
ensures public participation in almost all executive branch actions mandated by Con-
gress or the Constitution.
166. As a result of the Tuna/Dolphin Panel decisions and the U.S. proclivity to apply
trade sanctions unilaterally for various unfair trading practices, like those relating to
intellectual property rights, see Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2411 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), it appears that most GATT parties appear unconvinced that the U.S.
trade/environment agenda is genuine. This sentiment, however, neglects not only the
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on the U.S. government's desire to apply PPM trade measures to items like
driftnet-caught fish or to utilize related non-PPM environmental trade
sanctions.' 67 In the face of identifying and correcting severe or acute
environmental problems, and consequent trade-distorting PPM externali-
ties,16 the question of how to enforce responsible behavior in an interna-
tional vacuum remains unanswered.
16 9
A. Green 301
If the world recognizes responsible U.S. leadership on trade and the envi-
ronment, one possible solution is a "Green 301" provision, which could be
added to the U.S. Trade Act.170 Such an amendment could be either part
of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation' 7 ' or the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP) reauthorization bill, 172 and it could be explicitly
tied to unsustainable PPMs. A Green 301 proposal would essentially stipu-
late that certain foreign production methods constitute an unfair interna-
tional trading practice.
173
historical interest of the United States in limiting environmentally damaging trade but
also recent concerns. See, e.g., International Convention-Fur Seals, 37 Stat. 1542-1547
(convention between the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan to protect fur
seals and sea otters); H.R. Res. 246, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (by a vote of 362-0, the
House of Representatives expressed its sense of the Congress regarding the relationship
between trade agreements and U.S. health, safety, labor, and environmental laws).
167. The U.S. Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 1978, allows the President to block the
importation of any product from a country that is diminishing "the effectiveness of any
international program for endangered or threatened species." President Clinton
recently imposed trade sanctions on wildlife products against Taiwan for that country's
persistent trade in rhino and tiger parts in contravention of CITES. Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1085 (1973); 59 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 9, 1994).
168. See Repetto, supra note 149.
169. The recent amendments to the International Tropical Timber Agreement
(ITTA), Draft International Timber Agreement, 1994, Conference for the Negotiation of a
Successor Agreement to the International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1983, U.N.
Doc. TD/TIMBER.2/L.9 (1994), which add few meaningful reforms to global forest
management, are a good case in point. Noted William E. Mankin of the Global Forest
Policy Project: "It boils down to northern countries determined to protect their eco-
nomic interests and unwilling to abide by common standards-and developing coun-
tries who say, 'If you want us to save our forests, you've got to give us money.'" David E.
Pitt, Accord is Reached on Use of Forests, N.Y. TnMEs, Jan. 23, 1994, at A7.
170. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242. Section 301 allows the United States to
take unilateral trade measures against countries whose actions are "unjustifiable and
burdens or restricts U.S. commerce."
171. Whenever a trade agreement changes U.S. legislation, the President must seek
"fast track" authority if he does not want the agreement or its implementing legislation
altered by Congressional amendment. After receiving implementing legislation from
the executive, usually drafted in consultation with the legislative branch, Congress must
vote "yes" or "no" on the implementing legislation within 90 days of its introduction. 19
U.S.C. § 2191 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
172. Id. at §§ 2461-2465. For a general discussion of GSP, see Low, supra note 15, at
167-69; Paul Speck, Promoting Sustainable Development Through GSP: The Need for Reform,
IssuEs TRADE & SusmTAmiaLE DEv. (Envtl. & Energy Study Inst., Wash., D.C.), Aug. 1,
1994, at 1 (on file with author).
173. See, e.g., Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, A New Trade Policy to Confront a
Changing Reality, Address before the Economic Strategy Institute (May 11, 1993) (on
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Once the notion of a Green 301 was accepted, drafters would need to
identify a legal "trigger" for its application, as well as an equitable "com-
pensatory mechanism;" in other words, when would Green 301 be utilized
and how much would it cost the offending country? Although a plethora
of options exist,174 a Green 301 should probably be based on an environ-
mental injury related to trade, not on a trade injury related to environ-
mental competitiveness. This environmental emphasis not only addresses
the primary issue at hand, but it also helps avoid disguised green protec-
tionism. Thus, when an environmental PPM of another country is directly
harming the United States' 75 or a "global interest" (defined as a global
common entity or a resource protected by international agreement), the
United States should be able to levy a duty equal to the approximated cost
of the environmental injury176 caused by the PPM in question.
While a Green 301 might seem radical or heavy handed to some, it is
really only an extension of several existing international trends. First, if
based on unsustainable PPMs, a Green 301 would merely expand allowa-
ble product bans or tariffs to cover the product's full life cycle. 177 Also, to
the extent that duties are levied against products from offending PPMs,
such tariffication is consistent with GATT Article XI.178 Most importantly,
once a goal of preventing or controlling damaging PPMs was established
and accepted, strong standards would enhance international competitive-
ness. 179 Green 301, therefore, could become the catalyst for environmen-
tal and economic forces already underway.' 8
0
B. Precautionary 1901
A variant on the Green 301 approach would more fully embrace the "pre-
cautionary approach" in international trade negotiations and implementa-
tion. 18 1 Such an approach, which we will call "Precautionary 1901," could
file with author). "I refuse to accept the notion that we should lower our environmen-
tal standards so that our companies can compete more effectively .... [A Green 301]
would allow a stronger U.S. response to inadequate pollution control and worker pro-
tection around the globe."
174. See id. "We must get other countries to enforce their laws." (lax enforcement as
trigger); International Pollution Deterence Act, supra note 151.
175. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision (U.S. & Can.), reprinted in 35
AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter].
176. See, e.g., Frank Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. Rv. 269
(1989); Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages, 24 WAKE FORESr L. Ray.
851 (1989).
177. See, e.g., Summary Report: Workshop on Life-Cyce Management and Trade, OECD
Doc. ENV/EPOC (93)26 (Nov. 12, 1993).
178. See GATI, supra note 14, art. XI.
179. See, e.g., Michael Porter, Green Competitiveness, Sci. AM., Apr. 1991, at 168.
180. In addition, monies generated from a Green 301 could be used to finance the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) projects or other foreign assist-
ance programs.
181. Roughly translated, the term means "[w]hen it comes to environmental threats,
be safe rather than sorry." See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INsTrrrlTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT, TRADE AND SusrAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES 29 (1994); Ellen Hey, The Pre-
cautionay Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L
ENvrL. L. R-v. 303 (1992).
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combine the best elements of unilateral' 82 and multilateral 8 3 trade
actions. If an international agreement on a particular environmental
problem cannot be reached, the United States (or any other country)
should be permitted to impose unilateral quantitative or added-duty trade
measures for a set period of time (e.g., eight to ten years). Then, after that
time, if no international agreement was struck, the country using the trade
measure must either compensate the complaining party(ies)' 8 4 or rescind
the offending trade measure.' 85 Significantly, some unilateral PPMs and
certain sanctions should be automatically protected without resorting to
the Precautionary 1901 approach.' 8 6 Nonetheless, this approach could
solve the large bulk of potential PPM and trade problems.
C. An International Commerce Clause?
Trade pressure should only be a means to a greater end. Ideally, political
leverage by environmentalists will eventually enable the United States and
other like-minded countries to negotiate reasonable trade and environ-
ment rules that would make unilateral trade measures unnecessary.'
8 7
What would this global policy look like? Only clues exist. A particularly
182. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 140, at Principle 12. "Unilateral actions to
deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country
should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global envi-
ronmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus."
Id.
183. Although the legal status of multilateral agreements on PPMs in relation to the
GATT is unsettled and made even murkier by the Tuna/Dolphin II Panel, both the
United States and the European Union appear to believe that such agreements will
generally take precedence over the GAIT. See The GAT and the Trade Prvvisions of Mul-
tilateral Environmental Agreements, Group on Environmental Measures and International
Trade (EMIT), GAIT Doc. TRE/W/5 (Nov. 17, 1992) (submission from the European
Community); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 78.
184. See GAT, supra note 14, art. XIX (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products).
185. See William Reilly, Free Traders and Environmentalists: Differing Goals, Con-
flicting Cultures, Address at Stanford University (Oct. 13, 1993) (on file with author);
Kenneth Berlin & Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, 16 WASH. Q., Autumn
1993, at 35, 45.
186. Specifically, unilateral trade responses to environmental actions that directly
harm the United States or cause species extinctions would be explicitly protected. See,
e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation (Feb. 3, 1994), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Cngtst File (statement of Timothy E. Wirth, Counselor, State Dept.); Berlin & Lang,
supra note 185, at 48; Trail Smelter, supra note 175.
187. The point, here, is that countries would tend to be a lot more receptive to nego-
tiations linking trade and the environment if there were costs in delaying. See Letter
fromJolene Unsoeld (D-WA) and 80 other members of the House to President Clinton
(Feb. 14, 1994) (on file with author).
We would like to propose that, prior to or simultaneous with the April Ministe-
rial declaration to be signed in Marrakech, Morocco, GAT members agree to
a moratorium on challenges to environmentally inspired trade measures until a
Green Round (or negotiations) can address the issue in its full complexity....
Just last year the European Parliament called for a "two year moratorium on all
GAIT-panel judgements [sic] concerning the environment pending the
strengthening of GAIT articles and practices."
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intriguing analogue is the U.S. Commerce Clause,188 which, inter alia,
governs the trade rules between the states and the federal government.
18 9
Under this framework, the GATT's dispute settlement procedures and
legal tests would be central, 190 with three basic legal principles guiding the
panels. First, a country challenging a facially non-discriminatory environ-
mental law would have the burden of proving that the law has a discrimi-
natory effect.1 01 Second, if a country challenging an environmental law
demonstrated a discriminatory effect, then the defending country could
still justify the law by showing that it served a legitimate public interest and
that there are no available less-discriminatory alternatives. 19 2 Third, even
in cases where there is discriminatory intent in the questioned law, the
defending country could nonetheless still show that it serves a legitimate
environmental purpose and is the only means available to achieve that
purpose.' 9 3 Although it might be dangerous to carry the analogy too far,
U.S. law could at the very least assist the GATT in instituting environmen-




188. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
189. See, e.g., David A. Wirth, The International Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of
Federal States: How Close a Fit?, 49 WAsH. & LEE L Ray. 1389 (1992).
190. For reasons already described, the GATT's dispute settlement procedures are
hardly open or environmentally sensitive. See supra part VII. Some propose creating a
new international environmental institution expressly to counter the influence of the
GATT. Esr, supra note 157, at 78-98. Adding fuel to the fire is a clause in the pro-
posed WTO text which states, "Each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements." WTO Agreement, supra note 15, art. XVI, § 4.
191. See, eg., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that Arizona's
food safety standards were not even-handed, related to the stated objective, and were
overly burdensome on commerce). This test would have a dramatic effect upon the
European Union's recent challenges to the U.S. fuel efficiency standards and "gas guz-
zler" taxes. See Establishment of Dispute Settlement Panel Concerning Certain U.S.
Automobile Taxes and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Requirements, 58
Fed. Reg. 31,788 (1993).
192. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(holding that, in such cases, the burden is on the state tojustify benefits and nonavaila-
bility of adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147-48
(1986).
A State must make reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of com-
merce across its borders, but it is not required to develop new and unproven
means of protection at an uncertain cost.... Maine has a legitimate interest in
guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possi-
bility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible.
Id. The latter point is nothing more than the domestic iteration of the international
"precautionary principle" embraced by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, supra note
140.
193. In such cases, the defending party's law would undergo "strict scrutiny." See
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 147-48; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding
that, in such cases, courts will strictly scrutinize the state's objectives and available
alternatives).
194. Commerce Clause-like analysis might have clarified the U.S.-European beef hor-
mone dispute. See, e.g., Michael Froman, The United States-European Community Hormone
Treated Beef Conflict 30 HARv. Ir'L. L.J. 549 (1989).
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D. Foreign Environmental Practices Act
Other countries, particularly developing countries, have begun to react
with increasing consternation to the U.S. use of unilateral trade measures.
However, for reasons already outlined, countries sometimes need to resort
to unilateral measures for effective environmental protection. In the
trade area, these unilateral measures have generally followed a pattern
whereby other countries are sanctioned for proscribed actions. Yet this
kind of action is not the only type of unilateral measure available that
countries can employ. Countries could also control their own actions or
those of their own citizens abroad.'9 5 The United States, for example,
could pass a law requiring that its transnational corporations (TNCs) com-
ply with U.S. environmental regulations, including PPM requirements
while operating abroad.
19 6
Briefly, the principal sections of a FEPA would include a provision
providing that in the event of a conflict of laws between the United States
and the host country, U.S. TNCs must comply with whichever of the laws
of the host country or the United States that gives the greatest level of
protection to the host country's environment, although in no case would
compliance infringe upon a foreign country's sovereign authority to
enforce its own laws.' 9 7 Other provisions would set out the criminal penal-
ties and civil actions for violations of the act' 9 8 and establish the regula-
tory structure for the administration of the acL199
FEPA raises a number of political and legal issues such as defining a
U.S. TNC,20 0 enforcement of the act,
2 0 1 and questions of sovereignty202
195. See U.S. v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001 (1977).
196. See Neff, supra note 145. Neff makes this proposal which he entitled the Foreign
Environmental Practices Act (FEPA) and modeled after the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The authors have modified the Neff proposal.
197. Thus in the case of a direct conflict of laws, the host country's laws would
prevail.
198. Criminal penalties would put the full force of the U.S. prosecuting system
behind this legislation making it a more powerful deterrent. Civil actions would give
standing to U.S. citizens and allow them to take part in the monitoring process. It
could well be that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be the most vigilant
watchdogs.
199. The administrative section would be set up so that the the federal agencies
which already have jurisdiction over specific environmental laws would continue that
jurisdiction but now would include U.S. TNCs operating abroad in their scope of over-
sight. In promulgating compliance requirements for U.S. TNCs, the federal agencies
would have to take into account the extent of the host country's infrastructural capabili-
ties and other differences between the United States and the host country.
200. Defining what constitutes a U.S. TNC is not an easy task. Possible options could
include the place of incorporation, the use of the Internal Revenue Code concepts on
"look thru" provisions to determine ownership and foreign controlled corporations, see
generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 861-962 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), or the concept based on the
location of decision-making centers and the amount of influence parent entities exert
over subsidiaries (found in the United Nation's Draft Code on Conduct of Transna-
tional Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add.1 (1988) [hereinafter Draft Code]).
None of these options are truly sufficient by themselves, but there are also two jurisdic-
tional theories based on jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to prescribe, which
could be adapted to define a U.S. TNC. See RESTATEMENT (REvisED) OF THE FOREIGN
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and competitiveness. 20 3 Although these issues are important, an in-depth
discussion of them is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, there
are two fundamental objectives that are central to potential passage of
FEPA by the Congress.
First, at its core, FEPA is about regulating TNCs.20 4 TNCs are by far
the greatest participants in trade.20 5 Thus, where trade negatively impacts
the environment, TNCs are likely to be in a position to take responsibility
for some of those effects. 20 6 Indeed, agreements such as NMTA and the
Uruguay Round of the GATT have manifestly served to increase the power
and rights of TNCs, at the expense of individuals and sovereign govern-
ments. Now it is only fitting that these enterprises begin to take on some
of the responsibilities that go along with those rights.
Second, FEPA is a way for the United States to maintain a leading role
in global environmental protection. FEPA demonstrates the U.S. sincerity
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Introductory Note, pt. IV (Tentative Draft No. 6,
1985). The jurisdiction to adjudicate theory would be based on the "minimum con-
tacts" requirement. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Thus, any TNC meeting the "minimum contacts" requirement would be considered a
U.S. TNC for the purposes of the act. The jurisdiction to prescribe theory would be
based on the "economic effects" principle whereby a country can achieve jurisdiction
over a corporation located outside its borders on the grounds that the corporation's
conduct creates economic effects felt inside the country. See Daniel W. Schenck, Juris-
diction Over the Foreign Multinational in the EEC: Lifting the Veil on the Economic Entity The-
ory, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L 495 (1989). These two jurisdictional theories are very
broad and therefore could be very controversial. However, the difficulties of trying to
apply any of these options to define a U.S. TNC highlights the problem that one coun-
try faces in regulating transnationals.
201. Enforcement raises both a practical question and a legal question. Practically, it
involves first, the amount of bureaucracy that will be required to make the act work and
second, who will actually report violations (foreign citizens, NGOs, or competing
TNCs). More importantly, the legal question of enforcement raises the issue of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic law and also the potentially sensitive situa-
tion of the United States being in the position of enforcing other countries' laws.
202. It may be that countries would view FEPA as an aid in protecting their own
environment or as unwarranted meddling in their internal affairs. Neff, supra note 145,
at 523-27. Perhaps one solution is to ensure that decisions are made in full consultation
with the host countries.
203. The competitiveness argument can play out in two ways. First, there is the ques-
tion of whether U.S. businesses will be harmed or benefitted in the global market. Over-
all, the empirical data does not show that there has been a discernible competitiveness
effect upon U.S. firms. Id. at 508, 527-28. Second, there is the question of whether the
products of U.S. TNCs will be less competitive after the costs of complying with U.S.
environmental regulations have been factored. This problem, however, is the very PPM
problem that this article is trying to resolve. Thus, any solutions such as border taxes or
a "green 301," supra part VIII.A, could potentially also be applied to other corporations'
products that do not take environmental costs into account.
204. Although an international attempt was made to regulate TNCs under the Draft
Code, supra note 200, the code is virtually ignored. See RicHARD J. BtRNEr & JOHN
CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMs (1994).
205. See LANG & HINES, supra note 25.
206. See Mitchell Zuckoff, Foul Trade, BosToN GLOBE, July 10, 1994, at 1, July 11,
1994, at 1,July 12, 1994, at 1. This was a three-part series on U.S. business practices in
developing countries, including the dumping of toxic wastes and the selling of U.S.
banned pesticides.
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of commitment to doing its part in taking care of the environment. In
light of the North-South rift, it also shows goodwill and may help develop-
ing countries to continue developing without contributing to greater
destruction of their environment. FEPA also encourages the spread of
"enviro-technology" and PPM standards without the harshness of sanc-
tions, which are the hallmarks of other unilateral trade measures. 20 7 At
the very least, FEPA can be a tool to spark greater dialogue at both the
national and international levels about how to handle the subject of sus-
tainable development and the role commercial enterprises should play in
that process.
E. Wild Bird Conservation Act
The U.S. Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992 (WBCA) is an exemplary
piece of legislation that employs the use of PPM trade measures to regu-
late unsustainable trade in wild birds. 208 The WBCA can be used to serve
as a case study for the NAFTA Commission on Environmental Coopera-
tion (CEC) through which the issue of PPMs can be addressed.2 0 9 Such
an examination will facilitate deliberations on the issue of PPMs in other
fora and assist in specifying criteria for identifying laws that restrict trade
based on harmful PPMs.
The WBCA was enacted in 1992 for the purpose of ensuring that the
import of wild birds into the United States is conducted on a sustainable
basis and in a manner that does not in any way jeopardize wild popula-
tions.2 10 At its core, the Act aims to distinguish birds based on their
method of production by promoting the use of captive-bred, not wild-
caught birds or birds that were sustainably harvested rather than taken
under an unregulated and unsustainable regime.
2 11
The Act also uses the three appendices of CITES as a shorthand for
identifying species that Congress believes deserve protection through
quantitative import restrictions. On the enactment date, the Act placed
an immediate moratorium on the importation of the ten bird species
listed in CITES Appendix II that have been hardest hit by the commercial
trade.2 12 One year later, the importation of all CITES-listed species was
207. See, e.g., Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 3; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 53; Steel Leg-
Hold Trap, supra note 89.
208. Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992 (WBCA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 49014916 (Supp. V
1993).
209. See Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (1994), which states that
[i]n accordance with Article 10(2) of the Environmental Cooperation Agree-
ment, it is the policy of the United States to promote the consideration of, with
a view towards developing recommendations and reaching agreement on, the
following priorities within the Council of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation .. . pursuant to Article 10(2) (m), the environmental impact of
goods throughout their life cycles, including the environmental effects of processes
and production methods ....
(emphasis added).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 4902.
21L See GATT, supra note 14, art. III; NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 103.
212. 16 U.S.C. § 4904.
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prohibited under the Act, unless that species was placed on an "approved"
list or was imported under an allowed exemption. 2 13 A captive-bred
CITES-listed species can be placed on the approved list if it was bred at a
facility approved by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or if it is a species
that is commonly bred in captivity and for which there are no wild-caught
birds of the species in trade.2 14 For a wild-caught CITES-listed species to
be placed on the list, the country of origin must have an FWS-approved
scientifically-based management plan that provides for the conservation of
the species and its habitat and ensures that trade is conducted on a sus-
tainable basis.
215
The WBCA makes an excellent case study for several reasons. First,
prior to the enactment of the Wild Bird Conservation Act, the United
States was the world's largest importer of wild birds.216 Second, the
WBCA furthers the measures contained in CITES, a treaty expressly incor-
porated by NAFrA.21 7 Third, the WBCA is achieving environmental
goals. 218 Fourth, the Act operates primarily to promote captive breeding
and the sustainable management of wild bird populations in countries of
export and does not seek to end the trade of birds per se or in a protection-
ist manner.2 19 Fifth, all three NAFTA parties contributed to the decline of
wild bird populations.220 Sixth, wildlife trade, both legal and illegal, is
expected to increase between Canada, Mexico, and the United States with
213. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4904-4905.
214. 16 U.S.C. § 4905.
215. Id.
216. Between 1980 and 1989 nearly seven million wild birds were imported into this
country. GRETA NiLssON, IMPORTATION OF BiPDs INrro THE UNrTED STATES 5 (1992)
[hereinafter IMPORTATION REPORT] (on file with author). U.S. consumers generated a
global demand that threatened the survival of bird species and their habitats as well as
undermined the laws of foreign countries.
217. NAFTA, supra note 14, art. 104. In proposing standards for defining what con-
stitutes a sound sustainable management plan or an acceptable foreign captive-breed-
ing facility, the drafters of the WBCA used as guidelines the scientifically-based
standards of CITES. Jane Earley, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Case of
PPM's and Trade in Wild Birds, Remarks at the OECD Informal Workshop on Trade
and Environment: PPM Issues, Helsinki 5-6 (April 6-7, 1994) (transcript on file with
author). Furthermore, the WBCA was a necessary complement to wild bird protection
measures adopted by the CITES parties to stem imports into the United States.
218. According to FWS law enforcement personnel stationed at ports of entry, bird
imports have declined dramatically since enactment of the WBCA. Telephone inter-
views with Wildlife Inspectors, FWS (New York and Miami Ports) (1994).
219. The WBCA established mechanisms for financial and technical assistance for
foreign bird conservation programs.
220. See generally DEBRA A. ROSE, A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: THE
IMPACTS ON WILDuFE TRADE (1991) [hereinafter TRAFc REPORT] (on file with author).
Mexico is a known center for illegal trade in wildlife, particularly in wild birds. Despite
a national law generally banning the export of native species, many of Mexico's rare
species are illegally smuggled across the Texas-Mexico border where they are sold for a
high price in the international market. Id. The lax enforcement of Mexico's regula-
tions governing trade in non-native species has also contributed to making the country
a center for the transshipment of bird species originating in South America, Africa, and
Asia. Moreover, many believe that Canada is a haven for wildlife smuggling and that as
the United States enacts legislation that restricts wildlife imports, such as the WBCA,
the flow of affected species (e.g., birds) will simply shift northward, entering Canada to
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the implementation of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. 221 Finally, wild-
caught birds are carriers of several diseases known to infect both livestock
and humans.
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What should the CEC do with the WBCA? First, the CEC should con-
duct an analysis of existing domestic legislation regulating wildlife and/or
bird trade in all three countries. 223 Second, the CEC should investigate
legal and illegal wildlife trade along the common borders and how that
trade has and will continue to change with the implementation of
NAFTA.2 24 Third, the CEC should devise an action plan for the manage-
ment of wildlife trade that incorporates cooperative efforts that are to be
undertaken by Canada, Mexico, and the United States.225 Fourth, the
CEC should initiate cooperative efforts between bird breeders in Canada,
Mexico, and the United States to encourage the establishment of captive-
breeding programs that facilitate trade.22 6 Fifth, because CITES is an
important area for cooperation among Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, the fulfillment of CITES provisions by NAFTA members would then
help to facilitate the CEC's task of monitoring trade and will promote con-
tinuity among the countries' import and export of wildlife. Sixth, an
explicit link should be established between the CEC, the public advisory
be reexported to the United States across the Canadian-United States border. Tele-
phone interview with Ron Ornstein, International Wildlife Coalition (Apr. 11, 1994).
221. Monitoring incoming wildlife shipments will become increasingly more difficult
with an increase in the flow of goods across the borders. In addition, as tariffs are
lowered, the U.S. Customs Department will lose its traditional financial incentive to aid
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in enforcing wildlife trade laws.
222. Infectious diseases such as the exotic Newcastle disease, psittacosis and salmo-
nellosis are sometimes found in imported birds, thereby posing serious health risks.
IMPORTATION REPORT, supra note 216, at 66.
223. This analysis should center on the effectiveness of each country's legislation in
regulating the trade, with particular emphasis on enforcement. All three countries
have extensive domestic legislation for the protection of native and non-native wildlife
in trade. To promote consistency among these regulations, discrepancies should be
identified and efforts should focus on supporting those provisions that offer greater
protection. See, e.g., ROBERT A. PASTOR, INTEGRATION WrrH MExico: OPrIONs FOR U.S.
POLICY 74 (1993).
224. TPA.mc REPORT, supra note 220, at 3. Particular attention should be paid to the
ability of law enforcement officers to distinguish otherwise "like" birds on the basis of
how they were harvested. Also of concern should be the likely increase of outbreaks of
avian-transmitted diseases.
225. Included in the action plan would be several initiatives for enhancing enforce-
ment capabilities. The CEC can improve the enforcement of these regulations by initi-
ating a unified effort among the three countries to strengthen enforcement along the
borders, particularly in terms of the number of enforcement personnel. Training pro-
grams need to focus on NAFTA-related activities. Inspectors must be familiar with the
wildlife laws and regulations of each NAFTA member.
226. Since the enactment of the WBCA, bird breeders within the United States have
started to set up networks in which those breeding a particular species work collectively
to establish an extensive and well organized breeding program. Participants benefit
from information-sharing on what strategies or practices are beneficial, and they are
also able to exchange breeding birds for enhancing genetic diversity. They have also
established studbooks to assist in maintaining records concerning genetic variability.
Laurella Desborough, President's Message, A.F.A. WATCHBIRD (American Fed'n of Avicul-
ture, Phoenix, Ariz.), Dec. 1993, at 22.
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committees, and other interested parties on the management of the wild
bird trade.2 27 Finally, the CEC should develop a program of public out-
reach and education on the wild bird trade.
22 8
The seven activities outlined above are designed not only to promote
compliance with the WBCA in a cooperative manner, but also to demon-
strate the environmental importance of distinguishing like products in
certain circumstances. The goal of such a work plan is not to institutional-
ize the use of all PPM trade measures per se, but to identify a specific envi-
ronmental PPM-related problem that illustrates the substantial limits of
present international trade law in this area. Once a series of PPM-related
environmental problems are resolved, a more general rule defining their
legal acceptability should emerge. The WBCA project identified here rep-
resents an early but important step in this process. Thus, the CEC should
agree that the trade in wild birds is a legitimate and serious conservation
problem, facilitate cooperative. trade and enforcement actions necessary to
attain the goal of wild bird conservation, and identify the trade lessons
learned from the WBCA work program. Once these tasks are complete,
the NAFTA CEC will be able to report its results to the GATT/WTO,
OECD, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the United
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and other
international trade/environment bodies.
Conclusion: Even Truffulas Need Sustainable PPMs
You're in charge of the last of the Truffula Seeds.
And Truffula Trees are what everyone needs.
Plant a new Truffula. Treat it with care.
Give it clean water. And feed it fresh air.
Grow a forest. Protect it from axes that hack.
Then the Lorax and all of his friends may come back.
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A wide variety of environmental problems now seriously threaten life
all over the world. Most if not all of these problems can be directly linked
to damaging production and process methods, and the international com-
munity has responded to some of these PPMs with multilateral agree-
ments. But these same PPMs are anathema to the legal international
227. NGOs can play a valuable role in assisting with enforcement issues, research,
education, and information sharing. Often these groups have the capability to investi-
gate and monitor suspected cases of illegal wildlife trade or problems in enforcement.
For example, Defenders of Wildlife is currently in the process of conducting a survey of
FWS Law Enforcement Personnel in order to identify obstacles that hinder the enforce-
ment of CITES and domestic wildlife laws.
228. With the implementation of NAFTA, tourism among the three countries is
expected to increase. Citizens need to be aware of the laws and regulations of all
NAFTA members governing the purchase and import of wildlife specimens and prod-
ucts and other relevant factors such as the risk of disease. A substantial amount of
illegal noncommercial wildlife imports entering the United States are associated with
uninformed tourists returning from vacation in NAFTA member countries. TRAnc
REPORT, supra note 220, at 2.
229. DR. SEUSS, THE LoRAx (1971).
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trading system. If a country attempts to limit trade in a product based on a
PPM, such action will almost certainly violate GATT rules. It seems appar-
ent that the legal regime which fosters such a result must be changed.
But "change" is not and will not be easy. Entrenched economic inter-
ests tend to dislike additional regulatory oversight. Institutional bureau-
cracies become accustomed to established rules and practices. The fears
of the poor are usually not assuaged by paternal environmentalism. Even
assuming political will is found, accurately communicating what exactly
needs to be fixed, and how to do it, is difficult at best.
Defining and implementing the GATT's exact reform agenda with
regard to PPMs and other environmental concerns will not occur over-
night. A modem understanding of sovereignty, the role of individual citi-
zens, and the fate of the world's living natural resources are all at stake.
From even a purely economic vantage, however, the objectives of the
GATT/WTO must be more clearly elucidated. At present, the GATT
seems to be more concerned with saving corporate investments than com-
batting "protectionism."230 Trade barriers need not be lowered for their
own sake. For instance, if protectionism is not being alleged against U.S.
dolphin-safe tuna laws, then the question arises why the United States has
been brought before a GATT dispute settlement panel and twice lost.
Therefore, it seems likely that GATT articles will need to be amended
or reinterpreted if trade is to become truly sustainable.23' Also necessary
is a radical restructuring of the process by which international trade rules
are made and enforced. While the additional points of view that openness
provides may make the trading system a bit more cumbersome, increased
public participation will prevent seismic political tremors down the road.
Indeed, the often vociferous disagreements on the degree of substantive
and procedural reforms needed by the GAIT serve only to underscore the
high political stakes in reconciling trade and the environment.
Without serious and determined reform, not only U.S. environmental
laws, but also global sustainability efforts, will continue to receive the same
old GATI decisions and neglect in a powerful WTO. The EU, for exam-
ple, has recently targeted legitimate U.S. federal and state legislation as
illegal trade barriers under the WTO.2 3 2 The Clinton administration, as
well as members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, must not cede U.S.
environmental sovereignty. The United States must relentlessly push for
the legitimization of PPM standards that achieve real environmental suc-
cess. After all, this debate at its root is about defining sustainable develop-
ment-that conceptually appealing, but factually ambiguous concept.
233
230. Defining this term is literally the $64,000 question. We define protectionism as
erecting trade barriers that shelter an economic interest from a competitor who does
not seek to gain a commercial advantage at the expense of a larger, defined societal
interest. See generally ROBERT HEILERONER, BEvOND THE VEIL OF ECONOMICS (1988).
231. The GATI has not been amended since 1965.
232. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRImRS TO TRADE AND
INVESTMENT (1994).
233. See THE BRuND TmA-m REPORT, supra note 6.

